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“Corruption can only be examined and eradicated in an environment of pluralism, 
tolerance, freedom of expression, and individual security . . . .” 
— DR. OSCAR ARIAS SÁNCHEZ1 
 
 
“I fear three newspapers more than a hundred thousand bayonets.” 
— NAPOLEON BONAPARTE2 
 
 1. Oscar Arias Sánchez, Foreword to JEREMY POPE, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM, 
at ix (2000). Dr. Sanchez is a former president of Costa Rica and a Noble Peace 
Prize Laureate. Id. at ix n.1. 
 2. THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY: A BOOK OF READING 254 (George L. Bird 
& Frederic E. Merwin eds., 1942) [hereinafter THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY]. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In Kenya, hardly a day passes without the media highlighting 
corruption in the government. The vice continues to immensely 
impact various aspects of the nation’s life: health-care continually 
deteriorates as vital infrastructures fail;3 millions of innocent children 
are denied access to education as public funds are embezzled with 
reckless abandon;4 the transport network becomes dilapidated as 
well-connected contractors make “quick kills;”5 the public “voice” is 
continually ignored as government officials spend public funds as 
they wish;6 the scales of justice continually skew as the wealthy and 
 
 3. See Catherine Karong’o, Healthcare in Kenya Ailing, CAPITAL NEWS, 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/Kenyanews/Healthcare-in-Kenya-ailing-
8369.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (emphasizing that the main challenges in 
Kenya’s health sector are “low quality services, old and dilapidated infrastructure, 
inadequate financial resources, inaccessible healthcare . . . , unaffordable health 
care and poor health systems”). See generally KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION COMM’N, 
SECTORAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION IN KENYA: THE CASE OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY (2010), available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/health-
report.pdf. 
 4. See How Corrupt Officials Stole Free Primary School Cash, THE 
STANDARD (Kenya), Dec. 17, 2009, http://standardmedia.co.ke/archives/ 
sports/InsidePage.php?id=1144030579&cid=4& (reporting that the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission has evidence of the embezzlement of 103 million Kenyan 
Shillings); Jeff Otieno, UK Withholds Kenya Grant Over Corruption, DAILY 
NATION (Kenya), Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/820998/-
/item/0/-/109gea5z/-/index.html (noting that the U.K.’s Department for 
International Development suspended its financial support for Kenya’s free 
primary education program following reports of massive embezzlement of funds); 
Michael Ranneberger, Address Graft for Reforms to Succeed: US Envoy, DAILY 
NATION (Kenya), Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-
/1064/850600/-/wrufnjz/-/index.html (stating that the U.S. government suspended a 
capacity building program in response to widespread corruption in Kenya’s 
Ministry of Education). 
 5. See KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION COMM’N, EXAMINATION REPORT INTO THE 
SYSTEMS, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF THE ROADS SUB-SECTOR 45-
49 (2007), available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/ROAD-EXAMINATION-
REPORT.pdf (recognizing problematic loopholes in the stages of approving 
consultants and engineers which have led to abuse of discretion and favoritism in 
selecting contractors); Make a Move on Dilapidated Roads, MARS GROUP KENYA 
MEDIA (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/multimedia/?Story 
ID=251162&p=Kasarani&page=4 (describing the status of disrepair of Kenya’s 
roads and lamenting the behavior of local companies who do a poor job of 
repairing the roads). 
 6. See KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS & TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
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influential capture the national judiciary;7 Kenyans continually 
witness the pilferage of public funds through shoddy deals between 
gluttonous public officials and their ilk in the private sector;8 and, 
consequently, an overwhelming proportion of Kenyans languish in 
abject deprivation and socioeconomic inequality.9  
 
KENYA, LIVING LARGE: COUNTING THE COST OF OFFICIAL EXTRAVAGANCE IN 
KENYA 8-12 (2007), available at http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/Living 
Large.pdf (reporting on the Kenyan government’s frequent purchase of luxury cars 
for use by senior government officials, and arguing that these purchases constitute 
human rights violations to the extent they limit the government’s ability to fulfill 
certain social, economic, and cultural rights); KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N & 
KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEHAVING BADLY: DECEPTION, 
CHAUVINISM AND WASTE DURING THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS (2006), 
available at http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/referendumreport.pdf 
(highlighting cases of plunder of public funds during the November 2005 
constitutional referendum). 
 7. See REPUBLIC OF KENYA, REPORT OF THE INTEGRITY AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA, VOL. I (THE RINGERA 
REPORT) (2003), available at http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/ 
Government/Ringera_Report.pdf (highlighting the nature and forms, causes, 
magnitude and level, and impact of corruption in the Kenyan judiciary); 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION AND 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (2008) (ranking the Kenyan Judiciary as the sixth most corrupt 
institution in the country); cf. REPUBLIC OF KENYA, REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF THE JUDICIARY 4 (2005), available 
at http://www.deontologie-judiciaire.umontreal.ca/fr/textes%20int/documents/ 
KENYA_RAPPORT_COMITe_000.pdf (noting with regret “the emergence of a 
trend of persons critical of the Judiciary to continue to demean the institution on 
the grounds of the previous reports of corruption and unethical practices”). 
 8. For insights into the pecuniary costs of corruption in Kenya in the period 
1991-1998 alone, see Aitan Szlapak, Will Corruption Ever Stop Developing in 
Kenya 67-84 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished MSc. Dissertation, University of Bristol), 
available at http://www.tikenya.org/documents/dissertation.doc. See generally 
KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, THE 2006 HAKI INDEX: MEASURING PUBLIC 
PERCEPTION ON THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CASE OF THE DEVOLVED 
PUBLIC FUNDS (2006), available at http://kitutuchache.com/images/stories/ 
Resources/Haki.pdf (focusing on embezzlement of the devolved public funds). 
 9. See U.N. Dev. Program, The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights 
Based Approach to Development, at 26 (Sept. 2004) (by Thusitha Pilapitya), 
available at http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs05/Thusitha_final.pdf 
[hereinafter Impact of Corruption] (quoting former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s remarks on the adoption of the U.N. Convention against Corruption: 
“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately—by diverting funds intended for 
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, 
feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid”); 
see also U.N. Dev. Program, Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth 
of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, at 145 (Nov. 2010) (by Jeni 
2010] THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE 37 
 
According to the Kenyan chapter of the Berlin-based 
Transparency International (“TI”), with a bribery index10 of about 
31.9%,11 Kenya currently ranks as the third most corrupt country in 
larger East Africa,12 having only relinquished her long-held top spot 
 
Klugman et al.), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010 
_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf (ranking Kenya’s human development 128th out of 169 
countries ranked, and in Africa 15th out of 51 countries ranked); Facts and Figures, 
U.N. DEV. PROGRAM—KENYA, http://www.ke.undp.org/ resources/33 (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2010) (highlighting that 45.9% of Kenyans live below the international 
poverty line, with 41% living in food poverty (extreme hunger)); A Brief General 
Profile on Inequality in Kenya, DEVELOPMENT POLICY MANAGEMENT FORUM, 
http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/ (follow “A Brief General Profile on Inequality in 
Kenya” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (highlighting the disturbing reality of 
unfairness and inequality in the distribution of national resources in Kenya); 
KENYA NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STRATEGIC PLAN 2009-2013, at 4, 
available at http://www.knchr.org/ (follow “KNCHR Strategic Plan 2009-2013” 
hyperlink) (profiling poverty and inequality as two of the core problems in Kenya); 
SAMUEL LANDO & ABDALLA BUJRA, DEV. POLICY MGMT. FORUM, CLASS 
FORMATION AND INEQUALITY IN KENYA (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/downloads/class%20formation%20&%20inequality%2
0in%20kenya.pdf (noting that the Kenyan government’s social policy suffers from 
a narrow focus that does not directly address “unemployment, inequalities, [and] 
poverty”); AFR. CTR. FOR ECON. GROWTH, THE LINK BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND 
POVERTY: LESSONS FROM KENYA CASE STUDIES (Andrew Mullei ed., 2000), 
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/ 
UNPAN005215.pdf (profiling corruption as one of the contributors to continued 
impoverishment in Kenya); World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Unit 
Afr. Region, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment Report: Vol. I Synthesis 
Report, Rep. No. 44190-KE (June 2008) (Draft), available at 
http://aideffectivenesskenya.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_downl
oad&gid=519&Itemid=324 (highlighting the extent and nature of poverty and 
inequality, as well as the drivers of these worrying statistics). 
 10. The “bribery index” is a global tool utilized by TI to measure the extent and 
magnitude of bribery in a country. In arriving at the index for a country, several 
factors are taken into consideration, including the likelihood of encountering 
bribery-demand situations, as well as the prevalence, severity, impact, and 
frequency of bribery. Africa and Middle East Surveys and Indices, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/ 
africa_middle_east (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 11. TRANSPARENCY INT’L—KENYA, EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2010 14 
(2010), available at http://www.tikenya.org/documents/EABI-2010.pdf. The Index 
was the product of a regional survey (conducted in January through to March 
2010) targeting some 10,505 randomly selected households. 
 12. Id. With a bribery index of 33%, Uganda ranks as the second most corrupt 
country in the region, with Tanzania coming fourth at an index of 28.6%. The 
aggregate index for Rwanda, the tiny nation recuperating from the horrendous 
38 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
to the war-ravaged Burundi.13 Globally, according to a 2009 TI 
report, Kenya has a Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”)14 of 2.1, 
and is the thirty-third most corrupt country (out of the 180 countries 
ranked),15 scoring close to the likes of the Central African Republic 
and Cote d’Ivoire.16 Indeed, on the TI’s corruption barometer, the 
 
1994 genocide, could not be formulated from the limited number of reported 
bribery incidents in the country (78 bribery experiences out of 4,350 interactions 
with service delivery institutions, translating to an index of 6.6%). See Kenya: 
Burundi Most Corrupt Country in East Africa as Its Revenue Authority Tops List of 
Corrupt Institutions, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (July 22, 2010), http://www. 
transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2010/2010_07_22_ti_
kenya_eabi (noting further that the vast majority of East Africans who experience a 
bribery situation do not report it to the authorities). 
 13. TRANSPARENCY INT’L—KENYA, EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2009 10 
(2009), available at http://www.tikenya.org/documents/EABIReport09.pdf 
[hereinafter EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2009]. In 2010,with a bribery index of 
36.7%, Burundi ranks as the most corrupt country of the five East African 
countries in focus, the other four being Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. In 
2009, with a bribery index of 45%, Kenya was the most corrupt of the three East 
African countries under review, the other two being Uganda and Tanzania, with 
bribery indices of 35% and 17%, respectively). Id.; see East African Bribery Index 
2009: The Kenya Police is the Most Corrupt Institution in East Africa, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (July 2, 2009), http://www.transparency.org/news_ 
room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2009/2009_07_02_kenya_index (highlighting, 
inter alia, the fact that the police force in the three East African countries top their 
respective aggregate indices for corruption in public institutions). 
 14. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: CORRUPTION 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 395, 402 (Dieter Zinnbauer et al. eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009] (defining the CPI as the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, 
measured by businesspeople and country analysts on a scale of 0 to 10, with the 
lowest numerical score indicating the highest perception that corruption exists). 
 15. See id. at 184, 401 (ranking Kenya in the countries grouped as the 147th 
least corrupt out of 180 countries surveyed). The most recent figures, published in 
TI’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, show Kenya as having the 154th least 
perception of corruption, out of 178 countries ranked. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/55725/890310. 
 16. See id. at 401 (indicating that both the Central African Republic and Cote 
d’Ivoire have a CPI score of 2.0, ranking them in the group of countries listed as 
the twenty-ninth most corrupt). For a general discourse on the exposition of how 
corruption and other vices have made Africa lag behind, see generally GREG 
MILLS, WHY AFRICA IS POOR (2010) (arguing that the cause of Africa’s poverty is 
largely internal, stemming from decades of economic mismanagement by the 
continent’s leaders); Jesse Wachanga, Corruption: The Curse of Africa’s 
Development, KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, http://www.kacc.go.ke/ 
docs/Corruption-curse-Africa.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (lamenting corruption 
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“pressure” in Kenya records a high of 3.5 out of a possible 5.17 
Undoubtedly, it is this state of affairs that once prompted Sir Edward 
Clay, the British High Commissioner to Kenya from 2001 to 2005, to 
fiercely remark that the “gluttony” of senior officials in the Kenyan 
government was causing them to “vomit all over our shoes.”18 
It suffices to mention that corruption in Kenya predates the 
country’s independence, though successive post-independence 
regimes have been haunted most.19 Even today, it continues to bite 
ferociously in the face of concerted calls for measures to sustainably 
curb it.20 As early as the 1980s, various individuals and organizations 
 
as the biggest impediment to Africa’s development); ARTURO ESCOBAR, 
ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD 
WORLD (1995) (explaining that some once vibrant Third World economies 
collapsed as corruption and other vices set into their respective national systems).  
 17. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 29 (2009), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/43788/701097/ 
[hereinafter GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2009] (listing Kenya’s “Public 
Officials/Civil Servants” as the sector which those polled considered most 
corrupt). 
 18. Edward Clay, The Damage Corruption is Doing to Kenya, MARS GROUP 
BLOG (July 19, 2010), http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org/?p=2055 (decrying the evil 
of corruption in Africa generally and using Kenya as a particular point of 
reference). Sir Clay made this remark in a fiery speech at a private luncheon for the 
British Business Association of Kenya in July 2004. The remark did not sit well 
with senior government officials, and eventually led to his being declared persona 
non grata in Kenya. Anne Penketh, Kenya Tells Former Envoy Clay He is 
‘Persona Non Grata,’ INDEPENDENT NEWS (UK), Feb. 6, 2008, 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-tells-former-envoy-Clay-he-is-
persona-non-grata-778673.html. 
 19. See Robert Conley, Joyful Kenya Gets Independence from Britain: London 
Frees Final Colonial Holding in East Africa—Seat in U.N. Assured, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 1963, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1212.html 
(covering Kenya’s emergence as an independent nation); About KACC: History, 
KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, http://www.kacc.go.ke/default.asp? 
pageid=2 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (referencing anti-corruption legislation in 
force in Kenya since 1956); Joel D. Barkan, Kenya After Moi, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 87, 
88-90 (2004) (calling Kenya a “classic example of ‘big man’ rule” in the late 
1980s, where corruption was the principal mechanism by which the Moi regime 
maintained its power). 
 20. For insights into corruption in Kenya, see generally MICHELA WRONG, IT’S 
OUR TIME TO EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLE-BLOWER (2009) (narrating 
the experiences of the former Kenyan anti-corruption czar, Mr. John Githongo); 
LUDEKI CHWEYA ET AL., CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN KENYA: LEGAL-POLITICAL 
DIMENSIONS, 2001-2004 (Ben Sihanya ed., 2005); LAWRENCE MUTE & S. 
KICHAMU AKIVAGA, DESTROY CORRUPTION BEFORE IT DESTROYS YOU AND YOUR 
40 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
spoke out openly to virulently criticize the rampantly thriving culture 
of corruption in the public sector, which was quickly plunging the 
country’s economy into its lowest ebb.21 In particular, opposition 
politicians, supported by the then highly-gagged media, heavily 
criticized the government’s record on economic regulation, calling 
for concerted reform measures.22 However, it was only in the late 
1990s that the government formally acknowledged corruption as a 
national issue.23 This acknowledgement, however hollow, laid the 
basis for a resolve to formally fight the vice.24 
Today, the resolve to fight corruption is an integral part of the 
nation’s socioeconomic development policy, at least in theory. Over 
the last eight years or so, Kenyans have seen a proliferation of 
legislation on the subject; after seeing the country’s economy nearly 
brought to its knees, the National Assembly has passed a series of 
 
COUNTRY (2002); CTR. FOR LAW & RESEARCH INT’L, ANATOMY OF CORRUPTION 
IN KENYA: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Kivutha 
Kibwana et al. eds., 1996).  
 21. See Barkan, supra note 19, at 89 (detailing rises in poverty percentages and 
declines in annual income per capita, and recognizing that demands for change in 
the corrupt regime came first from “disaffected elites and ordinary citizens” in the 
1980s, followed by international actors and donors in the early 1990s). 
 22. See CTR. FOR LAW & RESEARCH INT’L, INITIATIVES AGAINST CORRUPTION 
IN KENYA: LEGAL AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS, 1995-2001 § 9.2 (Kivutha 
Kibwana et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter LEGAL AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS] 
(recognizing the outcry against corruption by opposition parties, which became 
possible only after Kenya returned to a multiparty democracy, and highlighting the 
impact of public debate in the fight against corruption); KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMM’N, THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN KENYA: A YEAR OF POLITICAL 
HARASSMENT (1993) [hereinafter A YEAR OF POLITICAL HARASSMENT] 
(highlighting the violent suppression of the media and political activism that 
characterized 1992, the year Kenya formally returned to multiparty democracy); 
L.O. Odhiambo, The Media Environment in Kenya Since 1990, 61 AFRICAN 
STUDIES 295 (2002) (noting the media’s important and increasing role in Kenya’s 
“political liberalization,” but decrying those obstacles to media freedom such as 
weak constitutional protections and judicial tendencies to protect the “politically 
connected”).  
 23. See LEGAL AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS, supra note 22, § 1.1.1 (noting that 
the Kenyan government took steps to display its “intentions of undertaking legal 
and other public policy reforms that would address corruption,” including the 
establishment of the Anti-Corruption Squad, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, 
and the publication of other legislative proposals). 
 24. See id. (contending that while the Kenyan government’s overtures may 
have generated optimism, the stagnant political environment “cast[s] doubt” on the 
government’s commitment to combating corruption). 
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laws to address Kenyan corruption, including the Anti-Corruption 
and Economic Crimes Act of 2003 (“ACECA”),25 the Public Officer 
Ethics Act of 2003,26 the Government Financial Management Act of 
2004,27 the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005,28 the 
Witness Protection Act of 2006,29 and the recent Fiscal Management 
Act of 2009.30 Collectively, these laws vitally laid the normative and 
institutional foundations for the anti-corruption crusade in the 
country, which continues to writhe in pains inflicted by the 
monstrous vice. 
On the regional and international fronts, Kenya has ratified a 
number of legally binding normative arrangements on corruption, 
which equally reflect the resolve to fight the socioeconomic and 
political evil in all its forms. For instance, at the global level of the 
United Nations (“U.N.”), she is party to the Convention against 
Corruption (“UNCAC”),31 which was adopted to “promote and 
 
 25. Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2009) Cap. 65 (Kenya), 
available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/aceca.pdf. In its preambular text, the 
Act “provide[s] for the prevention, investigation and punishment of corruption, 
economic crime and related offences.” Id. pmbl.  
 26. Public Officer Ethics Act, (2009) Cap. 183 (Kenya), available at 
http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/poe.pdf. In its preamble, the Act conveys a 
purpose of, inter alia, “advanc[ing] the ethics of public officers by providing a 
Code of Conduct and Ethics for public officers and requiring financial declarations 
from certain public officers.” Id. pmbl. 
 27. Government Financial Management Act, (2009) Cap. 412B (Kenya), 
available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Acts/Government%20Financial 
%20Management.pdf. The Act seeks to streamline the management of public 
financial affairs by making the Treasury responsible for “establish[ing] procedures 
and systems for proper and effective management of government money and 
property.” Id. § 4(a). 
 28. Public Procurement and Disposal Act, No. 3 (2005), KENYA GAZETTE 
SUPPLEMENT No. 77, available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/PPDA.pdf. 
The Act establishes “procedures for procurement and the disposal of 
unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stores and equipment by public entities.” Id. § 2. 
 29. Witness Protection Act, No. 16 (2006), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 
61, available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/WPA.pdf. The Act was passed 
to provide “for the protection of witnesses in criminal cases and other 
proceedings.” Id. pmbl.  
 30. Fiscal Management Act, No. 5 (2009), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 
83, available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Acts/Fiscal%20Management 
%20Act.pdf. The Act was passed to provide for the regulation and oversight of the 
national budget process.” Id. pmbl. 
 31. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. 
42 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more 
efficiently and effectively.”32 She is also a party to the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crimes,33 which was adopted “to 
promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized 
crime more effectively.”34 Similarly, at the African Union (“A.U.”) 
regional level, she is a party to the Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (“A.U. Convention on Corruption”).35 This 
Convention was adopted to “[p]romote and strengthen the 
development in Africa . . . of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, 
punish and eradicate corruption and related offences,”36 and to 
“[e]stablish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and 
accountability in the management of public affairs.”37 
This article explores the role of the media in the fight against 
corruption in Kenya. It does so by presenting the achievements 
registered by the media in recent years, while weighing these against 
the challenges encountered and the prospects on the horizon, in that 
 
A/RES/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003). Kenya was the first to sign this instrument on 
December 9, 2003, and ratified it on the same day. See United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (listing all the 
signatories and parties to the Convention and the dates upon which each country 
signed and/or ratified). 
 32. Id. art. 1(a).  
 33. U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes, G.A. Res. 
55/25, UN Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000). Kenya acceded to the Convention 
on June 16, 2004. See Status of the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang 
=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (listing all the signatories and parties to the 
Convention and the dates upon which each country signed and/or ratified). 
 34. Id. art. 1. The Convention obliges states parties to “prevent, deter, and 
punish” the corruption of public officials.” Id. art. 9.  
 35. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption art. 
2(1), opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter A.U. Convention 
on Corruption]. Kenya signed the Convention on December 17, 2003, ratified it on 
February 3, 2007, and deposited the instrument of ratification on March 7, 2007. 
See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, AFRICAN UNION (June 8, 
2010), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20 
Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf (listing fifty-three states 
parties and indicating whether each signed, ratified and/or deposited the 
Convention and the applicable date).  
 36. A.U. Convention on Corruption, supra note 35, art. 2(1). 
 37. Id. art. 2(5). 
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order. It further suggests potential enhancements to the role of the 
media in the anti-corruption crusade in the country. As such, it 
principally argues that the media, indeed, has a crucial role to play in 
the fight against corruption, a role in which the Kenyan media has 
already proved to be vital. The work finally concludes by 
unequivocally asserting that the Kenyan media has a bright and 
promising future ahead. Thus, reasonably, there is light at the end of 
the long dark tunnel of graft and corruption. 
It must be noted that this article presents a concise analysis of a 
critical issue in contemporary international (human rights) law and 
order. It cannot be gainsaid that the issues in focus—the freedom of 
expression, the freedom of the media, and the right to information on 
one hand, with corruption on the other—are all issues of concern to 
the contemporary discourse on international human rights. In fact, 
corruption is one of the profound travesties of human rights, with a 
particularly adverse impact on the realization of socioeconomic 
rights.38 Further, since the responsibility to fight corruption lies with 
all members of society, including the media, the national resolve to 
fight corruption ultimately lifts the freedom of expression, the 
freedom of the media and the corollary right of access to 
information, onto the center stage in the anti-corruption crusade.  
Before this paper delves into any substantive discussions on the 
subject at hand, it is imperative to clarify some of the key terms to 
which this work frequently refers. Four basic questions must be 
answered: What is corruption? What does the freedom of expression 
 
 38. See Impact of Corruption, supra note 9, at 9-10 (describing the express link 
between corruption and human rights—“[c]orruption can directly affect rights at a 
macro level and a micro, local level”—and stating that corruption hinders 
economic development and the provision of social services); 11th Int’l Anti-
Corruption Conference, Seoul, S. Kor., May 2003, The Seoul Findings, at 1, 
available at http://www.11iacc.org/download/finish/Provisional%20Seoul% 
20Final.30.5.03.doc (discussing the May 2003 international conference on anti-
corruption, which declared that “large-scale corruption should be designated a 
crime against humanity” and unequivocally condemned it as “immoral, unjust and 
repugnant to the ideals of humanity enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights”). Indian writer C. Raj Kumar aptly describes the interface, arguing 
that “corruption dilutes human rights in a significant way” and should be viewed as 
a human rights violation. C. Raj Kumar, Corruption and Human Rights: 
Promoting Transparency in Governance and the Fundamental Right to 
Corruption-Free Service in India, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 31, 35 (2003). 
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entail? What is meant by the right to information? What is meant by 
the freedom of the media? It is within the framework of these vital 
questions that this work draws upon the following operational 
definitions to generally guide the reader throughout the discourse. 
First, to understand the concept of corruption, this work relies 
heavily on the definition advanced by the U.N. Development 
Program: “the misuse of public power, office or authority for private 
benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, 
fraud, speed money or embezzlement.”39 Arguably, though 
corruption has meant different things to different people at different 
times and places, this definition comprehensively covers the various 
contemporary facets of corruption.40 It is worthwhile to additionally 
mention that the term “corruption” has its origins in the Latin 
adjective corruptus, meaning “spoiled, broken or destroyed.”41 This 
rightly explains the nature of the vice of corruption, which radically 
departs from the desired norms in both the public and private sphere 
and “amounts to ‘moral deterioration.’”42  
Turning to the freedom of expression, in the context of this work, 
the concept shall be taken to connote the freedom to “seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.”43 Consequently, the right to information is appreciated 
 
 39. U.N. Dev. Program, Mgmt. Dev. & Governance Div., Fighting Corruption 
to Improve Governance, at 6 (Nov. 13, 1998); cf. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS xxi (Dana 
Rodriquez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007) (identifying corruption as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”); Richard North, Corruption: Stopping the Rot, 
BBC ON AIR, Aug. 2003, at 10 (“Corruption is about the giving and seeking of 
favours, it is about buying political influence, taking kickbacks, bribing 
officials.”). 
 40. Cf. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 7 n.10 (1978) (comparing different definitions of corruption, which, 
according to Rose-Ackerman, diverge based on factors like impact, manifestations 
and motivation, and explaining that corruption can be likened to bribery, nepotism, 
and misappropriation). 
 41. Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Shuxia Jiang, The Economics of Corruption and 
the Corruption of Economics: An Institutionalist Perspective, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 
1043, 1044 (2007). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Declaration conjoins the freedom 
of expression with the freedom of opinion, thereby providing for the freedom to 
“hold opinions without interference” as another critical component. On the 
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as a corollary to the freedom of expression, and shall be understood 
as the right to access (seek and receive) information, including that 
held by the State.44 These are the meanings promulgated by the 
prevailing human rights instruments.45 
Finally, within the purview of the current work, the freedom of the 
media shall be understood as the freedom of electronic, print, and 
other types of media to broadcast, publish, or disseminate 
information or ideas through any medium. This entails the freedom 
to independently determine the editorial content of such broadcasts, 
publications, or disseminations. This is the understanding embodied 
in, for instance, the New Constitution of Kenya (“New Constitution 
(2010)”).46 
I. THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE RIGHT TO 
INFORMATION, AND THE FREEDOM OF THE 
MEDIA: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
A. A DISCOURSE ON CONTENT  
1. The Freedom of Expression 
The concept of freedom of expression is believed to have surfaced 
in ancient Athenian civilization47 and to have later been imparted to 
 
philosophy of Article 19 of the Declaration, see Article 19, The Article 19 
Freedom of Expression Handbook: International and Comparative Law, Standards 
and Procedures, at 8-10 (1993), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/ 
publications/1993-handbook.pdf. 
 44. See Article 19, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of 
Expression, and Access to Information, pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996), 
available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf 
[hereinafter Johannesburg Principles] (recognizing the importance of public 
access to government-held information in a democratic society). 
 45. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 19 (asserting that the 
right to information is part of the “right to freedom of opinion and expression”). 
 46. See CONSTITUTION, art. 34 (2010) (Kenya) (providing for the “Freedom of 
the media” by explicitly prohibiting State interference with broadcasting and other 
media). 
 47. See KURT A. RAAFLAUB ET AL., ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT 
GREECE 65 (2007) (noting that the concept of free speech is thought to have 
emerged in ancient Athenian democratic ideology as early as the sixth century 
B.C.); see also Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t. Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 583 (Can.) (observing that “[f]reedom of expression is not . . . 
46 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
colonial-era American, British, and French societies.48 Today it is 
widely recognized in a plethora of international and regional human 
rights instruments dealing with civil and political rights. 
Internationally, within the U.N. human rights system, it is embodied 
in at least three major treaties adopted under the auspices of the 
global organization: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”),49 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”),50 and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”).51 Within the African regional system, this embodiment is 
found in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.52 This 
normative recognition received a major boost in 1996 when the 
essential character of the concept (and its corollary—the right of 
access to information) was reaffirmed in the Johannesburg 
Principles.53 Through various provisions, these Principles amply 
clarify the content of the freedom.  
 
a creature of the [Canadian] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] . . . [but] is one of 
the fundamental concepts that have formed the basis for the historical development 
of the political, social and educational institutions of western society.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen] art. 11 (Fr. 1789) (establishing the French 
view of freedom of expression by stating that “[t]he free communication of ideas 
and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man . . . [and e]very 
citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, if he accepts his own 
responsibility for any abuse of this liberty in the cases set by the law”). 
 49. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 19.(recognizing the universal 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to information). 
 50. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, adopted 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (proclaiming the right to 
freedom of expression as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but 
elaborating further on the many acceptable forms of information, including oral, 
written, printed, and art forms). 
 51. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 13(1), adopted Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC] (utilizing the same language as the 
ICCPR to provide the right to freedom of expression to children). 
 52. See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 9, adopted June 
27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Banjul Charter] (providing for the 
universal right to receive information). 
 53. See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, princ. 1 (proclaiming the right 
to freedom of expression for everyone). The Johannesburg Principles were 
“adopted . . . by a group of experts in international law, national security, and 
human rights convened by Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, 
in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg,” and have been referenced annually since 1996 
by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in its resolutions on freedom of 
expression. Id. at 4, Endorsements. 
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Basically, the various international and regional human rights 
instruments define the concept as constituting the freedom to “seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers,”54 through any medium of choice, be it oral, in writing, in 
print, through the internet, or through art forms.55 Thus the freedom 
of information implies three things: (1) the right to seek information; 
(2) the right to receive information; and, (3) the right to impart 
(disseminate) information and ideas of all kinds. 
In Kenya, utilizing a similar approach, the Old Kenyan 
Constitution (“Old Constitution (rev. 2008)”) defined the freedom of 
expression in terms of “[the] freedom to hold opinions without 
interference, [the] freedom to receive ideas and information without 
interference, [the] freedom to communicate ideas and information 
without interference . . . and [the] freedom from interference with his 
correspondence.”56 This definition is more particular than those 
advanced in the relevant international instruments.57  
Today, the subject features conspicuously in the new 
constitutional dispensation in Kenya, where the New Constitution 
(2010) unequivocally guarantees “the right [of everyone] to freedom 
of expression, which includes—(a) freedom to seek, receive or 
impart information or ideas; (b) freedom of artistic creativity; and (c) 
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.”58 This makes 
Kenya’s new constitutional dispensation congruent with her 
international human rights obligations, at least in the realm of the 
freedom of expression. 
2. The Right to Information 
The right to information, which implies the right to access 
 
 54. ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 
19. 
 55. ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2); CRC, supra note 51, art. 13. But see 
Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 9 (failing to delineate guidelines for the right to 
receive information and express and disseminate opinions). 
 56. CONSTITUTION, § 79(1) (2008) (Kenya). 
 57. Compare id. (specifying different ways that the freedom of expression can 
be exercised), with ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2) (using more general terms—
“freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds”). 
 58. CONSTITUTION, art. 33(1) (2010) (Kenya). 
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information, including that held by the State,59 has two distinct 
facets: it exists both as a corollary of the freedom of expression and 
as a self-standing right.60 As a corollary of the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to information implies the freedom to “seek, 
receive and impart information . . . of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers.”61 This means that the right is just a component of the 
freedom of expression. 
Be that as it may, we must remember that the right constitutes a 
crucial bulwark of democracy. It is essential for the general progress 
of a democratic society62—if people are to effectively monitor their 
government’s affairs and democratically participate in the running of 
society, they must “have access to government-held information.”63 
Accordingly, its abrogation would imply nothing short of abrogation 
of the ideals of democracy and good governance.  
Undoubtedly, it is against this backdrop that the right to 
information is generally recognized in various human rights 
instruments,64 with the A.U. Convention on Corruption innovatively 
proclaiming the right to information as a self-standing right. The 
 
 59. See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, pmbl. (noting that access to 
government-held information is necessary for people “to monitor the conduct of 
their government and to participate fully in a democratic society”). 
 60. See ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2) (including the right “to seek, receive, 
and impart information” as part of the right to freedom of expression); see also 
A.U. Convention on Corruption, supra note 35, art. 9 (calling for the adoption of 
legislation to give effect to the right to information). 
 61. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2). 
 62. See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, pmbl. (adding that the 
freedom of expression is additionally vital for social welfare and other human 
rights and freedoms). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 19 (proclaiming that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of . . . expression, [which] . . . includes 
freedom to . . . seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
regardless of frontiers”) (emphasis added); ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2) 
(incorporating the freedom to information as part of the right to the freedom of 
expression); CRC, supra note 51, art. 13(1) (ensuring the child’s right to freedom 
of expression, including the freedom to information); Banjul Charter, supra note 
52, art. 9(1) (declaring that “every individual shall have the right to receive 
information”); Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, princ. 11 (reaffirming the 
right to information and extending it to proclaim the right of every individual “to 
obtain information from public authorities, including information relating to 
national security,” unless the government can show a restriction is necessary to 
“protect a legitimate national security interest”). 
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Convention obliges states parties to “adopt such legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the right of access to any information that 
is required to assist in the fight against corruption and related 
offences.”65  
Judicially, the existence of the right to information was affirmed 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) in 
Claude Reyes v. Chile.66 In that case, three environmental activists 
had filed an access to information request with the Chilean 
government for copies of the background and environmental checks 
on the US-based company Trillium Corporation, which had been 
granted a license to carry out logging activities in the native Lenga 
forest.67 This information was not provided.68 After unsuccessfully 
petitioning the local courts, the activists approached the IACtHR, 
which ruled that Chile had violated Article 13 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom of 
opinion and expression.69 In this landmark ruling, the Court opined 
that democracy demands “maximum disclosure” of all government-
held information, save in a few exceptional circumstances.70 
Recently, the right to information was the subject of discussion at 
two meetings convened by the London-based organization “Article 
19,” which brought together a group of high-level U.N. and other 
officials, as well as civil society and academic experts in 
international human rights law.71 The meetings culminated in the 
production of a set of principles governing the progressive 
interpretation of international law and standards, acceptable state 
practice, and general principles of law recognized by the 
international community72—the Camden Principles on the Freedom 
 
65.  A.U. Convention on Corruption, supra note 35, art. 9(1). 
66.  Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
151 (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_151_ing.pdf. 
67. Id. ¶¶ 57(13)-(18). 
68. Id. ¶¶ 57(16)-(22). 
69.  Id. ¶ 148 (considering the American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, 
adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123). 
70. Id. ¶ 92. 
71.  The two meetings were held in London (Dec. 11, 2008 and Feb. 23-24, 
2009). 
72.  Press Release, Article 19, Geneva—Article 19 Launches the Camden 
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of Expression and Equality (“Camden Principles”).73 These 
Principles recognize the duty of the State to protect the right to 
information, including the right to access information held by public 
bodies, with emphasis on promotion of proactive disclosure of 
information.74 
In Kenya, the New Constitution (2010) expressly guarantees the 
right to information both as a corollary of the freedom of expression 
and as a self-standing right.75 Earlier, under the Old Constitution 
(rev. 2008), the right could only be implied from the Constitution’s 
language proclaiming the freedom of expression.76 
3. The Freedom of the Media 
Over and above proclaiming the freedom of expression and the 
right to information, various human rights instruments guarantee the 
freedom of the media. For instance, within the purview of the 
UDHR, the ICCPR and the CRC, the freedom of the media is 
implied in the general guarantee of the freedom of expression.77 The 
role of the media is also recognized in the Camden Principles, which 
tasks the media to take steps to, inter alia, “address as far as possible 
 
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality (Apr. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/geneva-article-19-launches-the-camden-
principles-on-freedom-of-expression-an.pdf. 
 73. Article 19, The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality 
(Apr. 2009), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/the-camden-
principles-on-freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf [hereinafter Camden 
Principles]. 
 74. Id. princ. 2.3. 
 75. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 33(1), 35(1) (2010) (Kenya) (“Every person has 
the right to . . . seek [and] receive . . . information or ideas . . .[, and e]very citizen 
has the right of access to information held by the State; and information held by 
another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or 
fundamental freedom.”). 
 76. See CONSTITUTION, § 79(1) (2008) (Kenya) (“[N]o person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom . . . to receive ideas and information 
without interference . . . .”). 
 77. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 19 (guaranteeing “[the 
freedom to] impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers”); ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(2) (expressly providing “[the freedom 
to] impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print . . . or through any other media of . . . choice” (emphasis 
added)); CRC, supra note 51, art.13(1) (establishing “[the freedom to] impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print, . . . or through any other media of the child’s choice”). 
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issues of concern to all groups in society.”78 Plausibly, this rightly 
brings the media onto the anti-corruption platform as a public 
watchdog. 
In Kenya, the New Constitution (2010) broadly guarantees the 
freedom of the media: 
Freedom and independence of electronic, print and all other types of 
media is guaranteed, . . . [and t]he State shall not exercise control over or 
interfere with any person engaged in broadcasting, the production or 
circulation of any publication or the dissemination of any information by 
any medium; or penalise any person for any opinion or view or the 
content of any broadcast, publication or dissemination.79 
B. DEMYSTIFYING THE REGIME ON RESTRICTIONS  
From ancient times, humanity has yearned for the freedom of 
expression and the right to information, yet censorship of such 
expression and information has also been an “ancient and almost 
universal phenomenon.”80 This presents a paradox; the aims of the 
freedom of expression, including the right to information, 
intrinsically conflict with those of censorship—the restriction of 
these rights and freedoms. The resulting scenario portends two 
diametrically opposed forces: the need to ensure enjoyment of the 
concerned rights and freedoms and the need to limit the enjoyment of 
these rights and freedoms to meet the general common good. 
To dispel the ostensible paradox, it is crucial for us to appreciate 
that, notwithstanding their general value to society, the exercise of 
the two is not absolute. First, their exercise is closely related to the 
rights and freedoms of others, and may be limited when it conflicts 
with these rights and freedoms and, second, the two can be restricted 
 
 78. Camden Principles, supra note 73, princ. 6.1(ii) (emphasis added). 
 79. CONSTITUTION, art. 34 (2010) (Kenya). 
 80. See Soli J. Sorabjee, Freedom of Expression and Censorship: Some Aspects 
of the Indian Experience, 45 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 327, 327 (1994) (noting the 
paradoxical relationship between freedom of expression and the countervailing 
urge to suppress speech); see also The Long History of Censorship, BEACON FOR 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/about_project/ 
history.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (explaining that censorship was popular in 
ancient civilizations, such as Rome and Greece, because “the ideal of good 
governance included shaping the character of the people”). 
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by the State in the interest of the public.81 
1. An International Perspective 
To check the possible vagaries of the so-called “justifiable 
restrictions,” the various regional and international instruments 
provide for built-in conditions that must be met for the restrictions to 
be authentic. For instance, the UDHR provides that the enjoyment of 
rights “shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law [to secure] due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and [to meet] the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”82 The 
ICCPR imposes similar conditions for the enjoyment of the right,83 
and additionally prohibits “propaganda for war” and “advocacy of . . 
. hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence.”84  
These requirements are further elaborated upon in the Siracusa 
Principles of 1984,85 adopted by the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, and in the Camden Principles of 2009.86 Similarly, though 
they do not rule out restrictions on the freedom of expression 
 
 81. See Sorabjee, supra note 80, at 328 (discussing various public interests 
recognized in human rights instruments that permit restriction on the freedom of 
speech, such as “interests of national security; territorial integrity or public safety; 
prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or morals; protection of 
reputation or rights of others; prevention of disclosure of information received in 
confidence; and maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”). 
 82. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 43, art. 29(2). 
 83. See ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(3) (“The exercise of [the freedom of 
expression] . . . may be subject to certain restrictions . . . as are provided by law 
and are necessary.”). 
 84. Id. art. 20. 
 85. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Status of the 
International Covenants on Human Rights: The Siracusa Principles on the 
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter 
Siracusa Principles] (delineating numerous principles relating to limitations that 
are “justifiable” because they are “[p]rescribed by law,” “[i]n a democratic 
society,” or related to “[p]ublic order,” “[p]ublic health,” “[p]ublic morals,” 
“[n]ational security,” “[p]ublic safety,” or the “[r]ights and freedoms of others”). 
86. See Camden Principles, supra note 73, princ. 11 (stipulating that a 
restriction should be the least intrusive measure available and proportionate “in the 
sense that the benefit to the protected interest outweighs the harm to freedom of 
expression”).  
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altogether, the non-binding (but morally persuasive) Johannesburg 
Principles place some specific limitations on restrictions on the 
freedom, particularly on the oft-invoked ground of national security. 
For instance, the Johannesburg Principles expressly proclaim that 
“[n]o restriction on freedom of expression or information on the 
ground of national security may be imposed unless the government 
can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is 
necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national 
security interest.”87 Thus, subject to very narrow exceptions, the 
peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression “shall not be 
considered a threat to national security or subjected to any 
restrictions or penalties.”88 It cannot be gainsaid that while the onus 
of “demonstrating the validity of the restriction [squarely] rests with 
the government,”89 the validity of the restriction turns on whether the 
same has a “genuine purpose and demonstrable effect of protecting a 
legitimate national security interest.”90 
The limitation on restrictions is particularly explicit in relation to 
the right to information. The Johannesburg Principles state that no 
restriction “may be imposed on the ground of national security unless 
the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by 
law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate 
national security interest.”91 In this respect, “a state may not 
 
 87. Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, princ. 1(d) (emphasis added). A 
restriction on the basis of national security is justified only if it aims at protecting 
the country’s existence, territorial integrity, or its capacity to respond to the use or 
threat of force; such a restriction is not justified if it merely aims to protect the 
“government from embarrassment or the exposure of wrongdoing.” Id. princ. 2; 
see Camden Principles, supra note 73, princ. 2.2 (providing for “permissible 
restrictions”—those provided by law, narrowly defined to serve a legitimate 
constitutional interest, and necessary in a democratic society to protect that 
interest); Siracusa Principles, supra note 85, princs. 15-21, 29-31 (interpreting and 
clarifying the phrases “by law,” “in a democratic society,” and “national security”). 
 88. See Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, princ. 7(a) (enumerating 
categories of speech that “shall not constitute a threat to national security,” such as 
speech that “advocates non-violent change of government policy” or criticizes the 
government, its symbols, its agencies, or its officials). 
 89. Id. princ. 1(d); see Siracusa Principles, supra note 85, princ. 20 (placing 
the burden on the State to demonstrate that the restriction does “not impair 
democratic functioning of the society”). 
 90. Johannesburg Principles, supra note 44, princ. 1.2. 
 91. Id. princ. 11 (emphasis added). 
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categorically deny access to all information;” it can only 
“designate . . . specific and narrow categories of information that it is 
necessary to withhold in order to protect a legitimate national 
security interest.”92  
Furthermore, under the Johannesburg Principles, disclosure of 
information is protected if it “does not actually harm and is not likely 
to harm a legitimate national security interest, or [if] the public 
interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from 
disclosure.”93 In fact, at all times, “the public interest in knowing the 
information [is to be regarded as a] primary consideration.”94 More 
importantly, however information may have been obtained, once it 
reaches the public domain, “any justification for trying to stop 
further publication will be overridden by the public’s right to 
know.”95 This practically negates any obligation to disclose the 
source of such information. 
2. A Kenyan Perspective 
In Kenya, where the law is better known for restriction, rather than 
protection, of the freedom of expression and the corollary right to 
information, the Old Constitution (rev. 2008) contained a 
comprehensive “claw-back” clause, which rooted freedom in the 
public interest generally, and specifically protected “the reputations, 
rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons 
concerned in legal proceedings.”96 Though it strived to counter the 
restrictions by utilizing the test of “reasonabl[e] justif[ication] in a 
democratic society,”97 the Constitution did not sufficiently protect 
against abuse because it failed to give any guidance on the exact 
meaning of this phrase. Expectedly, amidst the obscurity of the 
phrase, realization of the freedom of expression was largely reliant 
on the whims of the government of the day, with successive 
governments striving to subjectively define the circumstances under 
 
 92. Id. princ. 12 (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. princ. 15. 
 94. Id. princ. 13. 
 95. Id. princ. 17. 
 96. CONSTITUTION, § 79(2)(b) (2008) (Kenya). 
 97. See id. § 79(2)(c) (barring restrictions upon public officers or local 
government civil service if they are “shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society”). 
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which restrictions are to be imposed.98 
The New Constitution (2010) embodies general and specific 
restrictions. On a general note, it provides that all rights and 
freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are to not be limited  
except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
and justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—
(a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental 
freedoms . . . does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others; and (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and 
whether there are less restrictive means to achieve that purpose.99  
The Constitution goes on to provide for limitations specific to the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of the media. In the realm of 
the freedom of expression, it provides that the exercise of the 
freedom “does not extend to—(a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement 
to violence; (c) hate speech; or (d) advocacy of hatred”100 and “[shall 
be subject to] respect [for] the rights and reputation of others.”101 The 
same regime governs the exercise of the freedom of the media.102 
Surprisingly, the Constitution fails to provide for any express 
limitation on the exercise of the right to access information, thereby 
drawing us into uncertainties.  
C. THE THREE FREEDOMS: ESTABLISHING THE INTERFACE 
Quintessentially, the three freedoms—the freedom of expression, 
the right to information, and the freedom of the media—are all so 
crucial that they are widely referenced as constituting an 
indispensable dimension of governance in any democracy.103 It is 
 
 98. Cf. Alex Ndegwa, Kenya Scores “Very Weak” in War on Corruption, THE 
STANDARD (Kenya), Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage 
.php?id=2000004116&cid=4& (discussing Kenya’s shortcomings in providing 
access to information, and referencing the Official Secrets Act as a hindrance to 
public access to State information). 
 99. CONSTITUTION, art. 24(1) (2010) (Kenya). 
 100. Id. art. 33(2). 
 101. Id. art. 33(3). 
 102. Id. art. 34(1). 
 103. See, e.g., World Bank, Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., A Decade of 
56 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
hardly surprising that at its inaugural session in 1946, the U.N. 
General Assembly declared that the “[f]reedom of information is a 
fundamental human right and . . . the touchstone of all the freedoms 
to which the United Nations is consecrated.”104 In this respect, it can 
be plausibly argued that the three freedoms are crucial and 
indispensable to ascertaining the truth in any given society. 
Moreover, they interface so densely that they form an inseparable 
mosaic of rights crucial to democratic governance.105  
Judicially, the interface between the freedom of expression and the 
right to information was illustrated by the IACtHR, which, in its 
advisory opinion in Compulsory Membership in an Association 
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism,106 declared that 
“when an individual’s freedom of expression is [violated], . . . it is 
not only the right of that individual [journalist] that is being violated, 
but also the right of all others to ‘receive’ information and ideas.”107 
This understanding is equally reflected in the sentiments of the 
regional special procedures.108 
In the Kenyan context, reading between the lines in the relevant 
 
Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters 2007, at 2 (2007), 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/pdf/booklet_decade 
ofmeasuring_governance.pdf [hereinafter Governance Matters] (declaring freedom 
of expression and the right to information as part of one of six indicators of the 
quality of governance in a country, thereby recognizing their significant impact). 
 104. G.A. Res. 59 (I), ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 95 
(Dec. 14, 1946). 
 105. See Governance Matters, supra note 103, at 2 (identifying six aggregate 
indicators of good governance, including “voice and accountability,” which 
accounts for “freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”). 
 106. See Compulsory Membership Association Prescribed by Law for the 
Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶¶ 1, 29 
(Nov. 13, 1985) (interpreting Articles 13 and 29 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, which address the freedom of thought and expression). 
 107. Id. ¶ 30. 
 108. See Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Eur. [OSCE], Joint Declaration by the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on the 
Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression, at 3 (Dec. 20, 
2006), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/22784 
_en.pdf.html [hereinafter Joint Declaration] (stating that “[i]ntimidation of 
journalists . . . limit[s] the freedom of expression not only of journalists but of all 
citizens, because [it] produce[s] a chilling effect on the free flow of information”). 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights, one would safely deduce that this 
interface is amply reflected in the New Constitution (2010).109 Such 
reflection can, for instance, be seen in the common specific 
limitations regime governing the exercise of the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the media.110 
II. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION CRUSADE 
Over two centuries ago, Napoleon I opined that “[m]en are 
powerless to secure the future; institutions alone fix the destinies of 
nations.”111 Today, these words ring loudly across the globe as non-
state actors assume a vital role in shaping the destinies of the world 
generally, and of individual nations specifically. It is in this context 
that this article presents the role of media in the anti-corruption 
crusade. 
To amply discern the role of the media in the contemporary anti-
corruption crusade, this article’s point of departure will be to 
appreciate that the freedom of expression and the right to information 
play a joint role in shaping accountable and transparent governance 
in any democratic country. In this respect, a number of actors remain 
critical in ensuring this noble objective. Key among them is the 
media. Hence, this is why it is commonly argued that a free press is 
the “[conditio] sine qua non of a true democracy,” and that the 
media is the “fourth limb of government, that should not be 
derogated [from], curtailed, or otherwise limited except for very 
clear and justifiable reasons.”112 This standing gives the media a 
crucial significance in the anti-corruption crusade. 
The media’s role in the anti-corruption discourse is widely 
 
 109. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 33-35 (2010) (Kenya) (highlighting the media’s 
right to freedom of expression because it is, impliedly, fundamental to citizens’ 
access to information). 
 110. Id. arts. 33(2), 34(1). 
 111. Szlapak, supra note 8, at 2. 
 112. MEDIA LAW & PRACTICE: THE KENYAN JURISPRUDENCE 141 (David 
Makali ed., 2003) [hereinafter MEDIA LAW & PRACTICE]; see JEFFREY ARCHER, 
THE FOURTH ESTATE Author’s Note (1996) (discussing the concept of a “Fourth 
Estate,” which can be traced to the English practice of allowing the “Press Gallery” 
to observe the British House of Commons, and about which Edmund Burke once 
said: “Yonder sits the Fourth Estate, and they are more important than them all”). 
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recognized in existing international instruments. At the global level, 
the preamble to the UNCAC recognizes that, to be effective, the fight 
against corruption, though a primary responsibility of the State, 
requires the “support and involvement of individuals and groups 
outside the public sector,”113 which undoubtedly includes the media. 
More importantly, the UNCAC obliges states parties “to promote the 
active participation of [these] individuals and groups . . . in the 
prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public 
awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the 
threat posed by corruption.”114 Additionally, the UNCAC adds that 
this participation is to be strengthened by such measures as 
“[e]nsuring that the public has effective access to information”115 and 
“[r]especting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive, 
publish and disseminate information concerning corruption.”116 
Perhaps the value of the media in the anti-corruption crusade is 
more explicitly pronounced within the African system, where the 
A.U. Convention on Corruption expressly provides for “the right of 
access to any information that is required to assist in the fight against 
corruption and related offences.”117 In this respect, the Convention 
obliges states parties to fulfill two interrelated undertakings: first, to 
“[c]reate an enabling environment that will enable civil society and 
media to hold governments to the highest levels of transparency and 
accountability in the management of public affairs;”118 and second, to 
“[e]nsure that the [m]edia is given access to information in cases of 
corruption and related offences on condition that the dissemination 
of such information does not adversely affect the investigation 
process and the right to a fair trial.”119  
This spirit can also be read from the Camden Principles, which 
recognize the moral and social responsibility of the media to take 
steps to, inter alia, “address, as far as possible, issues of concern to 
 
 113. See G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 31, pmbl. (providing examples of actors 
whose support is necessary for the anti-corruption fight, including “civil society, 
non-governmental organizations, and community-based organizations”). 
 114. Id. art. 13(1). 
 115. Id. art. 13(1)(b). 
 116. Id. art. 13(1)(d). 
 117. A.U. Convention on Corruption, supra note 35, art. 9. 
 118. Id. art. 12(2) (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. art. 12(4) (emphasis added). 
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all groups in society.”120 Undoubtedly, today, corruption qualifies as 
one of the “issues of concern” to everyone in Kenya. 
III. THE KENYAN MEDIA IN THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION CRUSADE: TAKING STOCK OF THE 
ACHIEVEMENTS  
By and large, the relevant Kenyan laws are silent on the role of the 
media in the national anti-corruption crusade. Not even the principle 
legislation, the ACECA, attempts to address the subject.121 In fact, 
existing legislation is utterly silent on the role of all persons outside 
the public sector and the anti-corruption crusade is apparently seen as 
a governmental affair. Be that as it may, the Kenyan media has 
generally registered remarkable achievements in the fight against 
corruption in Kenya, visibly in four major fronts: as a “whistle-
blower;” in pilling pressure on government officials to account for 
their corrupt acts and omissions; in public education (dissemination); 
and, in investigative journalism.  
A. THE KENYAN MEDIA AS A “WHISTLE-BLOWER” 
In recent years, the Kenyan media proved pivotal in providing 
relevant information to members of the public and the international 
community alike.122 Crucially supplementing other actors, it has 
served as an effective whistle-blower. For instance, it helped unravel 
numerous multimillion dollar financial scams that nearly brought the 
Kenyan economy to its knees.123  
 
 120. See Camden Principles, supra note 73, princ. 6.1 (emphasis added). 
 121. See generally Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, (2009) Cap. 65 
(Kenya), available at http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/aceca.pdf (establishing the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate, prevent, and punish alleged 
economic crimes and corruption but failing to address specifically the media).  
 122. Cf. Ngovi Kitau, Daily Nation—Kenyans Must Seek Ways to Eradicate 
Political Corruption, ALLAFRICA.COM (Jul. 17, 2008), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/200807161081.html (providing information as to various factors 
contributing to political corruption in Kenya and advocating “the rule of law, 
transparency and accountability”). 
 123. See Gov’t May Withdraw Media Bill, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Aug. 10, 
2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 27284001 (indicating that laws protecting 
journalists’ sources from disclosure have enabled the press to uncover multiple 
financial scandals). 
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The first in line was a scandal costing the government over 60 
billion Kenyan Shillings (“KES”) (approximately USD 850 million) 
as a result of irregular foreign exchange claims and dubious export 
compensation awards to Goldenberg International based on fictitious 
gold and diamond jewelry exports.124 The scam, popularly known as 
the “Goldenberg Affair,” was the subject of a judicial commission of 
inquiry125 that eventually unearthed the involvement of wealthy 
private citizens and high-ranking officials in the highly maligned 
Moi government.126  
The Goldenberg Affair was only a precursor to other cases of 
grand corruption in the Kenyan government.127 For instance, early in 
 
 124. See generally BOSIRE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO THE GOLDENBERG AFFAIR (2005), available at 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/Goldenberg%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 
GOLDENBERG REPORT] (indicating that the scandal involved several fraudulent 
economic schemes and implicated numerous government officials and 
institutions); see also William Karanja, Kenya: Corruption Scandal, WORLD PRESS 
REV., Oct. 2003, http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1499.cfm (noting that 
approximately 60 billion Kenyan shillings (USD 850 million) were looted from 
Kenya’s Central Bank during the scam). 
 125. The Commission members were: Justice Samuel E.O. Bosire of the Kenya 
Court of Appeal (Chairman); Justice Daniel K. Aganyanya of the High Court of 
Kenya (Vice Chairman); and Mr. Peter Le Pelley, Senior Counsel. GOLDENBERG 
REPORT, supra note 124, at 10. The appointment of Justice Aganyanya was 
revoked following reports implicating him with corruption in office, and Mr. 
Nzamba Kitonga replaced him as both Commissioner and Vice Chairman. Id.; see 
Press Release, Kibaki Appoints a Tribunal to Investigate Puisine Judges (Oct. 15, 
2003), available at http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/oct03/200315100 
2.htm (reporting President Kibaki’s appointment of counsel to a tribunal tasked 
with investigating the alleged corruption of Judge Daniel K. Aganyanya). 
 126. See GOLDENBERG REPORT, supra note 124, ¶¶ 844-47 (listing those 
individuals found to be players in the Goldenberg Affair and referring them to the 
Attorney General for potential prosecution). 
 127. See, e.g., Grand Regency Saga Displays Rot in Kenya’s Elite, THE NAIROBI 
CHRONICLE, June 30, 2008, http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2008/06/30/ 
grand-regency-saga-displays-rot-in-kenyas-elite/ (explaining that participants in 
the Goldenberg Affair were later involved in the controversial sale of the Grand 
Regency Hotel to “Libyan investors” connected to Muammar Gaddafi). After the 
scandal, the Kibaki government commissioned a hitherto unpublicized report to 
investigate and trace assets obtained by Moi and his associates in the Goldenberg 
affair, as well as to gain a better understanding of general corruption during his 
presidency. KROLL ASSOCS. U.K. LTD., PROJECT KTM: CONSOLIDATED REPORT 
(2004), available at http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/resources/org.apache. 
wicket.Application/repo?nid=a2925d58-c6c9-11dd-b3f1-fd61180437d9. 
Investigations unearthed assets worth about USD 2 billion, located in London, 
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2004 Kenyans were informed of an even more monstrous scandal—
the “Anglo-Leasing Scam.” The multimillion dollar scandal, which 
TI rightly described as “albatross around the Kibaki government’s 
neck,”128 involved an array of contracts with non-existent entities for 
various fictitious security-related projects.129 The damning 
incontrovertible evidence that surfaced revealed that the scam 
involved senior-most officials in the then infant Kibaki regime, the 
majority of whom were the President’s closest political associates.130 
The thwarted scam’s intent was to reportedly raise funds for the 
President’s (and his associates’) re-election in 2007.131 Once again, 
the media played a crucial part in disseminating the damning 
 
New York, South Africa and Australia. Id. at Executive Summary.  
 128. See Mwalimu Mati, It’s Time to Tell the Kenyan People the Truth About 
the Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 22, 2006), 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2006/2006
_01_23_kenya_githongo (publicizing TI—Kenya’s call on Ministers and civil 
servants implicated in the scam to step aside to facilitate “impartial and 
uncompromised investigations” into the allegations). 
 129. See generally JOHN GITHONGO, FINDINGS OF GRAFT IN THE GOVERNMENT 
OF KENYA (2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09 
_02_06_kenya_report.pdf [hereinafter GITHONGO DOSSIER] (summarizing 
investigation procedures and conclusions of the former Permanent Secretary in 
Kenya’s Office of the President in Charge of Governance and Ethics, who led an 
investigation into graft in the Kenyan government relating to the Anglo Leasing 
scandal). The scandal is alleged to have started when, sometime in 2001, the 
government wanted to replace its old passport printing system with a state-of-the-
art tamper-proof system. Id. ¶ 4. Between late 2001 and late 2002, the Moi 
government had signed an overwhelming USD 443.36 million worth of contracts 
with a fictitious company, Anglo Leasing and Finance Limited. Id. ¶ 25. In January 
2003, the Kibaki government ratified the scam; between January 2003 and May 
2004, it had signed an additional USD 277.7 million worth of contracts, once again 
with the fictitious company. Id. This eventually saw Kenya grappling with massive 
scams to defraud public coffers of over USD 1 billion. 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 15, 19-21, 25. These associates of the President included: Dr. 
Moody A. Awori (then Vice President), Mr. Kiraitu Murungi (then Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs), Amb. Francis Muthaura (Head of Civil 
Service), Mr. David Mwiraria (then Minister for Finance), Mr. Chris Murungaru 
(then Minister for Internal Security), Mr. Dave Mwangi (then Permanent Secretary 
for Internal Security) and Mr. Joseph Magari (then Permanent Secretary for 
Treasury). Id. 
 131. See id. ¶¶ 27, 29 (describing discussions with Hon. Kiraitu regarding the 
possibility of another “resource mobilisation” Goldberg-type scam resulting from 
efforts to keep together the coalition against political opposition). 
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revelations, including the incontrovertible documentary evidence132 
gathered by the estranged former Permanent Secretary in the Office 
of the President (in charge of Ethics and Governance), Mr. John 
Githongo.133 
The year 2009 was yet another busy year, as the media revealed at 
least four more major scandals. In January 2009, when a food 
shortage was peaking in Kenya, Kenyans and the international 
community as a whole woke up to news of a scam relating to maize 
imports—the “Maize Scandal.”134 Hot on the heels of the Maize 
Scandal followed the “Triton Oil Scandal,” which involved the 
unauthorized release of oil by the Kenya Pipeline Company (“KPC”) 
without the knowledge of its financiers.135 Then, in November 2009, 
 
 132. See generally GITHONGO DOSSIER, supra note 129. 
 133. Mr. Githongo, a former head of TI—Kenya, was forced into exile (in the 
U.K.) amidst official frustration and threats to his life and personal security. He has 
since returned to Kenya after the government pledged to ensure his security. 
 134. See generally David Okwembah & Noah Chepleon, Revealed: Sh150 
Million Maize Scandal, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 10, 2009, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/513142/-/u18wmp/-/index.html. It was 
reported that some briefcase millers existing only on paper had been awarded large 
quantities of maize from the Strategic Grain Reserve, while others were awarded 
lucrative import permits by the National Cereals and Produce Board. It surfaced 
that some of these millers colluded with high ranking government officials to re-
direct cereals outside the country to avoid price controls. The millers supposedly 
made huge profits on the grains, while most of the importers brought in 
commodities that were subsequently declared unfit for human consumption. This 
affair was a huge insult for Kenyans, who were then facing one of the worst food 
shortages in the country’s history. Id. For additional background and details, see 
generally Raila on the Spot over Contaminated Maize, DAILY NATION (Kenya), 
May 13, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/598050/-/u69omg/-
/index.html; AFR. CTR. FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE, THE MAIZE SCANDAL (2009), 
available at http://www.africog.org/reports/Maize%20Report.pdf. 
 135. See Jaindi Kisero, KACC Asked to Probe $98.7 Million Triton Oil Theft at 
Kenya Pipeline, THE EAST AFRICAN, Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.theeastafrican.co. 
ke/news/-/2558/512818/-/rliqydz/-/index.html (detailing the initiation of an 
investigation by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and forensic auditors into 
the Triton Oil Scandal). Though it surfaced in January 2009, the scam occurred in 
2008, when KPC allowed Triton Oil Company to withdraw oil amounting to KES 
7.6 billion (approximately USD 98.7 million). By the time it collapsed in January 
2009, when the scam surfaced, the company had sold all the oil and “pocketed” the 
proceeds. Id. The proprietor, Yagnesh Devani, has since gone into exile, 
effectively fleecing the public coffer of billions. See No End to Triton Saga One 
Year On, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.nation.co. 
ke/business/news/-/1006/834932/-/hejqv2z/-/index.html (noting that although 
Devani is wanted in Kenya for theft, there may not be sufficient “political will” to 
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the Kenyan media widely publicized another scam—a hitherto 
“hidden” scandal on high-ranking Ministry of Education officials’ 
misappropriation of funds meant for the donor-funded Free Primary 
Education (“FPE”) program.136  
In December 2009, government proposals to exorbitantly 
compensate land-grabbers in the Mau Forest Complex surfaced, and 
implicated, among many, former President Daniel Arap Moi, who 
owns vast tea estates and a tea factory in the forest complex.137 
Ironically, Moi and the other supposed beneficiaries of the 
compensation plan had no valid title to the land in question.138 To 
make matters worse, ordinary squatters had earlier been evicted from 
 
bring him to justice). For additional background and details, see generally AFR. 
CTR. FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS OF THE TRITON OIL SCANDAL (2009), 
available at http://www.africog.org/reports/Africog%20newsletter-triton.pdf.  
 136. See Benjamin Muindi, Fake Receipts Used to Steal Free Schooling Cash, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/823252/-/vo3ojl/-/index.html (explaining that various government officials 
stole funds by falsifying documents and funding fake workshops); see also 
Benjamin Muindi & John Ngirachu, Back to School and to the Class Society, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 3, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/835626/-/voqp5j/-/index.html (commenting on problems undermining the 
quality of the educational system, including the failures that led to the FPE 
Program scandal); Brown Onguko, Op-Ed., Ministry has a Case to Answer, DAILY 
NATION (Kenya), Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-
/440808/832218/-/5pnnll/-/index.html (observing that anger over the scandal did 
not manifest until donors made threats to withhold funding unless legal action was 
taken, and suggesting particular approaches to investigate the scandal). 
 137. See Murithi Mutiga, Mau: Cabinet Memo Proposes Sh8.7b for Landlords, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 2, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/835012/-/voqkes/-/index.html (detailing how, despite denials by “Finance 
Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and his Forestry counterpart Noah Wekesa,” a cabinet 
memo proposed to pay Mau landlords up to KES 8.7 billion); see also Bernard 
Namunane, Raila Takes on Uhuru over Mau Payout, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Dec. 
22, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/829448/-/wtitx3z/-
/index.html (detailing the disagreement between the Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Finance over compensation of the Mau “landlords,” and noting that 
the quarrel was inspired by a media report indicating that President Moi and others 
may have received payouts for Mau lands); Paul N. Ndung’u, Op-Ed., Why All 
Settlers in the Forest Should Leave with Nothing, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 7, 
2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808/838030/-/5prs09/-/index. 
html (arguing that squatters should not be compensated for relocating from the 
Mau Forest because they do not possess legal title to such lands). 
 138. Mutiga, supra note 137.  
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the forest complex in a bid to reforest the reclaimed land.139 Just how 
Moi and his team were to benefit from the common squatter being 
forced into the cold remains incomprehensible to-date. 
Toward the end of January 2010, Kenyans awoke to the news that 
officials at the Nairobi City Council and the parent Ministry of Local 
Government had conspired to steal public funds by overpaying for a 
parcel of land on the outskirts of Nairobi.140 The deal, which 
reportedly led to the loss of KES 260 million (approximately USD 
3.5 million), is already haunting, among others, the Mayor of Nairobi 
(Mr. Geoffrey Majiwa),141 the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary (Mr. 
Sammy Kirui),142 and 12 other senior public officials143—all of whom 
are now either facing investigation or standing trial for corruption.  
In October 2010, Kenyans saw yet another mega-scam, the 
“Tokyo Embassy Scandal,” this time involving the country’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.144 On-going investigations have revealed 
that this scam cost the Kenyan public in the region of KES 1.1 billion 
(approximately USD 15 million).145 So far, a number of high-profile 
officials have “stepped aside” and are currently facing investigations, 
 
 139. See Ndung’u, supra note 137 (surveying the laws controlling whether the 
squatters can claim title to the land).  
140. Kenya Mayor in Corruption Charge Over Cemetery Scandal, BBC NEWS 
AFR. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11628433 
[hereinafter Charge Over Cemetery Scandal]. 
141.  Nairobi Mayor Grilled Over Cemetery Scandal, THE KENYA WEEKLY POST 
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.kenyaweeklypost.com/modules.php?name= 
News&file=article&sid=2151 [hereinafter Nairobi Mayor Grilled]; Charge Over 
Cemetery Scandal, supra note 140. 
142.  David Ochami, Kibaki Suspends PS, 12 Others Over Sh260m Cemetery 
Scandal, THE STANDARD (Kenya), March 8, 2010 http://www.standardmedia 
.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000005184&cid=4&ttl=Kibaki%20suspends%20PS,%
2012%20others%20over%20Sh260m%20cemetery%20scandal. 
143.  Id.; Nairobi Mayor Grilled, supra note 141. 
144.  See Michael Onyiengo, Kenyan Minister Steps Aside in Embassy Scandal, 
VOANEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Kenya-
Foreign-Minister-Resigns-in-Corruption-Scandal-105862903.html [hereinafter 
Kenyan Minister Steps Aside] (stating that the “most serious case” involved an 
overpayment for embassy property in Japan, despite “repeated assessments given 
to Kenyan officials deeming the land unsuitable for the embassy’s purposes”).  
145.  Samuel Siringi, Findings that Forced Minister and PS to Leave Under a 
Cloud, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.nation.co 
.ke/News/politics/Findings%20that%20forced%20minister%20and%20PS%20to%
20leave%20under%20a%20cloud/-/1064/1041786/-/415t0lz/-/index.html. 
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including the Minister (Mr. Moses Wetang’ula),146 the Permanent 
Secretary (Mr. Thuita Mwangi),147 and the former envoy to Japan 
(Mr. Dennis Awori).148 The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission is 
also investigating deals at the Kenyan missions in Islamabad, 
Brussels, Lagos, and Cairo.149 At the military level, since March 
2010, the Department of Defense is “writhing in pain” following 
damning revelations of corruption in procurement deals with some 
Jordanian and South African firms,150 not forgetting the embarrassing 
allegations of bribery during the recently-concluded armed forces 
 
146.  Kenyan Minister Steps Aside, supra note 144; Dave Opiyo & John 
Ngirachu, Wetang’ula, Permanent Secretary Resign in Graft Fallout, 
ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 27, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010280157.html 
[hereinafter Minister and PS Resign]; Emeka-Mayaka Gekara & Samuel Siringi, 
Kibaki Loses His Chief Envoy and Trusted Pointman, DAILY NATION (Kenya), 
Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kibaki%20loses%20 
his%20chief%20envoy%20and%20trusted%20pointman/-/1064/1041782/-
/6t0a4lz/-/index.html; James Macharia, Top Kenyan Officials Step Aside Over 
Embassy Scam, REUTERS ALERTNET (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.alertnet.org/ 
thenews/newsdesk/LDE69Q14X.htm [hereinafter Top Officials Step Aside]. 
147.  Minister and PS Resign, supra note 146; Top Officials Step Aside, supra 
note 146; Anthony Kariuki, Foreign PS Thuita Steps Aside Over Embassy Saga, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/ 
PS%20Thuita%20steps%20aside%20over%20embassy%20saga/-/1056/1041282/-
/15p0mlw/-/index.html [hereinafter PS Thuita Steps Aside]. 
148.  Daily Nation, Former Tokyo Envoy Questioned by Graft Team Over 
Dubious Land Deal, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 4, 2010), http://allafrica. 
com/stories/201011050098.html. 
149.  PS Thuita Steps Aside, supra note 147. 
150.  See David Okwembah, Queries Raised Over Military Choppers that Have 
Yet to Fly, Daily Nation (Kenya), Mar. 27, 2010, http://www.nation.co. 
ke/News/Queries%20raised%20over%20military%20choppers%20that%20have%
20yet%20to%20fly%20/-/1056/888378/-/view/printVersion/-/r6bi5sz/-/index.html 
(suggesting that recently acquired helicopters must be defective because they had 
been grounded for three months since arriving from China); Military Procurement 
Bosses Resign, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Nov. 17 2010, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Military%20procurement%20bosses%20resign%20
/-/1056/1055762/-/15a0egv/-/index.html (reporting that several military officials 
resigned the day before they were set to face questioning over the purchase of F-5 
jets from Jordan and personnel carriers from South Africa); Daily Nation, MPs 
Likely to Questions Jets Deal, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201011180370.html (noting that the officials’ scheduled 
appearance before the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defense and Foreign 
Relations was a “product of the new Constitution’s demands that all public 
officials . . . be accountable to citizens”).  
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recruitment.151 Sadly, in Kenya—“the land of corruption”—similar 
tales continue to unfold without any certainty as to when a cog in the 
wheel of corruption will break. 
The above cases amply illustrate the Kenyan media’s role as a 
public watchdog. Undoubtedly, the Kenyan public and the 
international community would not have known of any of these cases 
of grand corruption if the media, the indispensable public watchdog, 
had not uncovered them. The public only knew of these scams 
through newspapers, tabloids, and newscasts over nationwide radio 
and television. This reality carves a unique niche for the media in the 
country’s anti-corruption crusade. 
B. THE KENYAN MEDIA AND ENGAGEMENT WITH CORRUPT 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
In addition to helping unravel the massive scandals, the Kenyan 
media also generated sufficient pressure to force high-profile 
government officials to resign.152 So far, the axe has fallen on 
prominent allies of President Kibaki, including Mr. Chris Murungaru 
(Internal Security Minister, 2003-2004; Transport Minister, 2004-
2005),153 Mr. David Mwiraria (Finance Minister, 2003-2005),154 Mr. 
 
151.  See Harry Misiko, Fresh Corruption Claims in Armed Forces Recruitment, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/1051058/-/11hwsb4z/-/index.html (suggesting that corruption must have 
played a part in the recent “unprocedural dismissal[s]” of fourteen soldiers); 
Gerald Andae & Wycliff Kipsang, How Corruption is Denying Youth From Poor 
Families Jobs in the Army, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/201011030038.html (reporting on claims that prospective military recruits 
from poor backgrounds lost their slots to children of rich parents, who used their 
cash to secure military jobs). 
 152. E.g., Luke Mulunda & Macharia Gaitho, Shedding Image of a Moi Project, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), June 10, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Shedding 
%20image%20of%20a%20Moi%20project%20/-/1056/936174/-/30s4m1z/-
/index.html.  
 153. Dr. Murungaru had been implicated in a number of cases of corruption and 
economic crimes, the last in the series being the Anglo-Leasing Scam. See The 
Standard Team, Kibaki Okays Fresh Graft Probe on Murungaru, ALLAFRICA.COM 
(Jan. 16, 2006), http://allafrica.com/stories/200601160279.html (explaining the 
sacking of Murungaru and the opening of a probe into allegations of his 
involvement in Anglo-Leasing). 
 154. Mr. Mwiraria, who featured prominently in damning audio recordings 
released on the internet (in January 2006) by the then-exiled former graft tsar Mr. 
John Githongo, resigned on February 1, 2006. He was the first senior government 
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Kiraitu Murungi (Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
2003-2006),155 and Mr. Amos Kimunya (Finance Minister, 2005-
2006),156 all of whom were adversely mentioned (at various stages) 
in the Anglo-Leasing Scam. More recently, the Maize Scandal saw 
the temporal suspension of key officials in the Office of the Prime 
Minister (“OPM”) and the Ministry of Agriculture, including: Dr. 
Mohammed Isahakhia (Permanent Secretary in the OPM), Mr. Caroli 
Omondi (the Prime Minister’s Administrative Secretary), Mr. Ali 
 
official to resign over adverse implication in the Anglo-Leasing Scam. Ironically, 
he made a comeback when President Kibaki “cleared” him, despite there being no 
investigation into his alleged involvement in the saga, and appointed him Minister 
for Environment and Natural Resources on July 24, 2007. See Kenyan Finance 
Minister Resigns Following Corruption Allegations, VOANEWS.COM (Feb. 1, 
2006), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2006-02-01-voa53.html 
(explaining the circumstances surrounding Mwiraria’s resignation); Kenyan Graft 
Ministers Resign, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4670 120.stm (last 
updated Fed. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Kenyan Graft Ministers Resign] (reporting that 
Mr. Mwiraria was alleged to have “blocked investigations into the Anglo-Leading 
scandal,” but that he vehemently denied his involvement); The Standard Team, 
Mwiraria—It is an Honour to be Back, ALLAFRICA.COM (July 26, 2007), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/ 200707250772.html (noting that opposition members 
dismissed President Kibaki’s move as a “demonstration of lack of commitment in 
the fight against corruption” and reiterated their calls for those individuals 
implicated in the scandal to be “cleared in the ‘most proper way’”). 
 155. Kenyan Graft Ministers Resign, supra note 154. Ironically, on November 
15, 2006, Kibaki “cleared” and reinstated Kiraitu as Energy Minister. See David 
Mageria, Kibaki Reinstates Ministers After Scandal, INDEP. ONLINE NEWS (Nov. 
16, 2006, 1:20 AM), http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/kibaki-reinstates-ministers-
after-scandal-1.303407 (suggesting that this reappointment would anger “both 
Kenyans and donor nations”). 
 156. See Daily Nation, MPs Pass Vote of No-Confidence Against Kimunya, 
ALLAFRICA.COM (July 3, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200807030007.html 
(explaining that the vote was a result of his role in the “controversial sale of the 
Grand Regency Hotel”); Minister Quits Over Kenya Hotel Sum, AL JAZEERA (July 
8, 2008), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/07/2008781563453941.html 
(reporting that Kimunya was accused of undervaluing the Grand Regency Hotel in 
a sale to Laico, a Libyan agency); KenyanObserver, Amos Kimunya Resigns, THE 
NAIROBI CHRON. (July 8, 2008), http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2008/07/ 
08/amos-kimunya-resigns/ (explaining that Kimunya denied wrongdoing but still 
resigned after consultations with President Kibaki); KenyanObserver, Grand 
Regency Hotel—Pressure Mounts for Kimunya to Resign, BREAKING NEWS KENYA 
(June 29, 2008), http://www.breakingnewskenya.com/2008/06/29/grand-regency-
hotel-pressure-mounts-for-kimunya-to-resign/ (commenting on the pressure 
building “across the political divide” and that “[t]he history of the Grand Regency 
hotel reads like a chapter in the history of corruption in Kenya”).  
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Mohammed (Permanent Secretary, Special Programs), Dr. Romano 
Kiome (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture) and Mr. 
Gideon Misoi (Managing Director, National Cereals and Produce 
Board).157  
Similarly, following the revelation of the FPE scam, pressure 
mounted on high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Education, 
forcing, among others, the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary 
(Professor Karega Mutahi) to eventually throw in the towel.158 
Unfortunately, despite the pressure, the Minister (Professor Sam 
Ongeri) managed to carry on, capitalizing on the government’s 
modus operandi of burying its head deep into the sand, even amidst 
incessant calls for the sacking of all public officials implicated in the 
scam.159 Indeed, the Minister’s “endurance” ironically came despite 
the media’s incontrovertible documentation (and publication) of the 
Minister’s formal admission of culpability on his part.160 
C. THE KENYAN MEDIA AND PUBLIC DISSEMINATION ON ANTI-
CORRUPTION LAWS AND POLICIES 
The Kenyan media has equally been pivotal in the dissemination 
 
157. See Ben Agina, Top Government Officials Sent Home, THE STANDARD 
(Kenya), Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000 
003243&cid=4&ttl=Top%20Government%20officials%20sent%20home 
(indicating that the officials were shown the door as the government succumbed to 
pressure to act). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Kwendo Opanga, Op.-Ed., Why War On Corruption is Political 
Gimmickry, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.nation.co 
.ke/oped/Opinion/-/440808/861622/-/5rho4w/-/index.html (“[I]t is the same people 
who campaigned on an anti-graft platform in 2002 who campaigned on an anti-
graft platform in 2007 who condoned graft in 2003 through 2007 and who are 
implicated in graft in 2010.”). 
 160. See George Kebaso, Corruption in Kenya as Top Ministers Implicated, 
NEWSTIME AFR. (Feb. 14, 2010), http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/10858 
(detailing how the Education Minister, at a funeral service in South Mugirango in 
Western Kenya, publicly admitted diverting FPE funds to benefit his Gusii 
community); Education Minister Sam Ongeri Admits Diverting Funds, YOUTUBE, 
Feb. 13, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kx3RQLAbYOA (excerpting 
portions of a speech by the Minister, given in his local Gusii language, where he 
allegedly admitted to diverting the FPE funds). But see Minister Defends Use of 
Cash, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/862054/-/vqj48t/-/index.html (reporting how the Minister attempted to clear 
his name over the remarks made in South Mugirango, stating in particular that his 
remarks did not refer to the FPE funds). 
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of anti-corruption laws. This has been accomplished largely through 
frequent radio and TV talk shows on anti-corruption legislation and 
policies in the country and the region as a whole, where highly-
qualified guest speakers from the public and private sectors are 
invited to drive the agenda.161 Such shows include: Moving the 
Masses by the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (“KBC”);162 Agenda 
5 by the Kenya Television Network (“KTN”);163 and Hatua by 
Nation Television.164 Undoubtedly, the venture has been particularly 
fruitful in ensuring that the Kenyan public is enlightened on the 
existing normative and institutional frameworks for the fight against 
corruption, while also assessing the achievements and challenges for 
the anti-corruption crusade in Kenya.165 
 
 161. See Tom Odhiambo, Daily Nation—Corruption is Eating, But It Eats 
People Who Practice It, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 26, 2010), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/ 201002260850.html (noting that Kenyans “thrive on endless analyses of 
corruption on FM radio and TV stations . . .”); see also Radio Talk Show Hosts 
Arrested in Kenya, NOW PUBLIC (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.nowpublic.com/ 
world/breaking-news-radio-talk-show-hosts-arrested-kenya (reporting that radio 
talk show debates have “been hammering” the government’s plans to stifle the 
media through legislation).  
 162. The one-hour interactive show, sponsored by the National Anti-Corruption 
Steering Committee, is hosted every Sunday evening by Mr. Omar Hassan, a 
commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. Mr. Hassan 
succeeded Dr. Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba, a prominent don at the University 
of Nairobi’s Law School and the current Director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission. See Alphonce Shiundu, Will Action Speak Louder Than Words for 
PLO?, DAILY NATION (Kenya), July 28, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/ 
Will%20action%20speak%20louder%20than%20words%20for%20PLO/-
/1056/966512/-/49v2h0z/-/index.html (summarizing Mr. Lumumba’s work, both 
on and off the air).  
 163.  The program aims at breathing life into Kenya’s New Constitution, 
drawing on the popular concept of “we the people.” Hassan Omar Hassan, Agenda 
5 is About “We the People,” THE STANDARD (Kenya), June 22, 2010, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/commentaries/InsidePage.php?id=2000012237&c
id=15&.  
 164.  Hatua is Kenya’s premier human rights television talk show produced by 
the Mohamed Amin Foundation, with the financial support of the Open Society for 
East Africa. Hatua: TV Talk Show, THE MOHAMED AMIN FOUND., 
http://moforce.com/hatua.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 165. See Tim Kamuzu Banda & Robert Kalumba, Nation Stamps Its Authority 
as Media for Africa, DAILY NATION (Kenya), May 31, 2010, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Nation%20stamps%20its%20authority%20%20as
%20media%20for%20Africa%20/-/1056/929466/-/item/1/-/xuifyqz/-/index.html 
(asserting that the media is crucial in informing the public about important political 
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D. INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION IN KENYA 
Kenyan journalists have invariably engaged in investigative 
journalism to uncover the truth by carrying out constant independent 
“on-site” investigations.166 These ventures have ultimately cast a 
spotlight on graft in various public institutions, including the 
judiciary, various government ministries, public health facilities, 
public schools and colleges/universities, local government, the 
Kenya Police, the Kenya Ports Authority, and the Kenya Revenue 
Authority.167 
IV. THE KENYAN MEDIA IN THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION CRUSADE: PRACTICAL 
CHALLENGES 
A. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES 
In its continued efforts to expose various forms of corruption in 
Kenya, the media has faced a number of stiff challenges from the 
external environment. The challenges highlighted in this article stem 
from the experiences of the media during the subsistence of the old 
constitutional dispensation. Where applicable, developments 
heralded by the nascent dispensation in the New Constitution (2010) 
are highlighted, with a view to putting issues in perspective. Indeed, 
at the moment, we can only rely on time to tell how well this new 
dispensation practically addresses these challenges. 
1. Repressive Laws 
In Kenya, at least before August 2010, the right to freedom of 
 
and economic issues). 
 166. See, e.g., Gichinga Ndirangu, Daily Nation—Locals Deserve Less Economy 
on Truth, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 13, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201002 
151447.html (”Various arms of the public service remain fairly opaque and 
information on many issues of public interest has been the result of investigative 
journalism rather than an enabling policy on public communication.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Dave Opiyo, Kenya Police Most Corrupt Institution: Index, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), July 22, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Kenya 
%20Police%20most%20corrupt%20institution/-/1056/962512/-/view/printVersion/ 
-/15rr1t6/-/index.html (summarizing the results of the 2010 Transparency 
International Bribery Index survey on Kenya). 
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expression was not adequately protected. Though it recognized the 
right to this vital freedom, the Old Constitution (rev. 2008) provided 
for strongly-worded “claw-back” clauses which allowed derogation 
from what was guaranteed. For instance, the Constitution subjected 
the exercise of the freedom of expression to vague limitations in the 
name of public interest, including national security, “public safety, 
public order, public morality, or public health.”168 Notwithstanding 
the good intentions with which the limitations may have been 
devised, in the absence of any constitutional definition and guidance, 
these derogation provisions practically rendered the Constitution, the 
country’s supreme law, repressive.  
Buttressing the suppressive regime of the Old Constitution (rev. 
2008), existing laws equally portend serious challenges for the 
media’s engagement in the anti-corruption crusade. For instance, the 
Penal Code empowers the minister responsible for matters relating to 
national security to prohibit the importation of any publication if it 
appears to him that the prohibition is “necessary in the interests of 
public order, health or morals,” and is “reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.”169 Unfortunately, the Penal Code does not 
attempt to define any parameters of public interest. This vague 
reference has, over the years, operated in favor of State-sanctioned 
abuses.  
Mention must also be made of the Defamation Act, which, in 
1992, was amended by the largely pro-Moi National Assembly to 
introduce what was called “minimum damages” for certain kinds of 
libel.170 Expectedly, this development did not augur well with 
progressive journalists, judicial pundits, and legal activists, who 
interpreted the same as a move to restrict the freedom of expression 
in the countdown to the country’s first multiparty elections in 
twenty-five years.171  
Similarly, building on the spirits of the Old Constitution (rev. 
2008) and the Penal Code, the Communications (Amendment) Act of 
 
 168. CONSTITUTION, § 79(2)(a) (2008) (Kenya). 
 169. The Penal Code, (2008) Cap. 63 § 52(1) (Kenya). 
 170. The Defamation Act, (2005) Cap. 36 § 16A (Kenya). 
 171. See Mbugua Mureithi, Daily Nation—The Long Crusade to Silence Press, 
ALLAFRICA.COM (Apr. 28, 2002), http://allafrica.com/stories/200204280038.html 
(criticizing the 1992 Amendment for undermining the freedom of the press). 
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2009 (the “Amendment Act”) introduced new concepts into the 
Communications Act of 1998. The amendments have largely 
suppressed the freedom of expression and the right to information; 
they give the minister responsible for matters relating to information 
and communications wide-ranging powers, including the authority 
“to unilaterally, without recourse to parliament or the courts, enter 
and search broadcasting stations, and seize, dismantle and dispose of 
equipment” and “to intercept and disclose communications between 
persons, and to intercept, disclose and dispose of postal articles.”172 
Meanwhile, his counterpart in the Internal Security docket is 
empowered to “suspend electronic media services in case of public 
emergency.”173 Undoubtedly, these unrestricted “powers are likely to 
be abused,” bearing in mind the “heavy government composition of 
the regulatory authority”—the Communications Commission of 
Kenya.174  
 The New Constitution (2010) ostensibly remedies this anomaly; it 
guarantees not only the right to freedom of expression but also the 
right to receive information, including that held by the State. Be that 
as it may, the continued existence of the above and other related 
legislation in Kenya’s statute books portends a serious challenge for 
the media in the anti-corruption crusade, unless the much-yearned-
for “reformed judiciary” adopts a progressive approach to 
interpretation of the rights enshrined in the New Constitution (2010). 
However progressive the Constitution may sound, all largely 
depends on how the judiciary will respond in litigations seeking to 
enforce the rights. With the on-going purge of the judiciary, one can 
only be optimistic that the judiciary shall be the fountain of hope and 
justice for all aggrieved individuals and groups. Indeed, now and into 
the future, as they await full legislative implementation of the New 
Constitution, Kenyans shall rely on the ingenuity of the judiciary in 
applying the existing legislation in conformity with the new 
constitutional dispensation.  
 
 172. The Communications (Amendment) Act, No. 1 (2009), KENYA GAZETTE 
SUPPLEMENT No. 11 § 88. 
 173. Id. 
 174. REBECCA WANJIKU, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMC’NS, KENYA 
COMMUNICATIONS AMENDMENT ACT (2009): PROGRESSIVE OR RETROGRESSIVE? 
8-10 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.apc.org/en/system/file/CICEWA 
Kenya20090908_EN.pdf. 
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2. Forcible Suppression 
More often than not, the State has utilized unjustified force to 
silence media houses critical of its performance.175 The infamous 
“Standard Group Raid” vividly illustrates the lengths to which the 
State will go to suppress speech critical of the government. On 
March 2, 2006, hooded State agents, reportedly from the notorious 
Kwekwe squad,176 conducted two simultaneous commando-style 
“midnight raids” on the Standard Group, a Nairobi-based media 
house owning an independent local daily, The Standard, and Kenya’s 
oldest private television station, the KTN.177  
In the violent raids at the group’s printing press (in Nairobi’s 
Industrial Area) and the KTN station, the raiding agents seized 
several computers and tapes, vandalized television broadcast 
equipment and a printing press, and set ablaze over 20,000 copies of 
the day’s issue of The Standard. The raid was a response to an article 
published in The Standard that alleged, inter alia, damning 
revelations regarding huge financial scandals and official 
development of mercenaries within the Kibaki government.178 
 
 175. See generally A YEAR OF POLITICAL HARASSMENT, supra note 22. 
 176. See Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 10, U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 (May 26, 2009) (by Philip Alston) 
(offering clear insight into institutionalized execution squads within the Kenyan 
Police). The Kwekwe (“weed”) squad is an “informal” unit of elite police officers, 
which is widely thought to be responsible for the commission of rampant State-
sanctioned human rights atrocities, including systemic extrajudicial killings and 
torture of political dissidents. Id. 
 177. Andrew England, Police Raid Targets Kenya’s Second Largest Media 
Group, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d182f9cc-a9ff-11da-
96ea-0000779e2340.html; see Marc Lacey, Masked Officers Raid TV Station and 
Newspaper Plant in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/03/02/international/africa/02cnd-kenya.html (reporting on the response to the 
raid from various Kenyan political figures); Maria Lora, Police Raid Kenya Media 
Offices, CNN, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/02/ 
kenya.press/index.html (noting that the men were heavily armed with AK-47 
assault rifles, though not suggesting that anyone was injured); The Standard Team, 
“Standard” Under Attack, ALLAFRICA.COM (Mar. 2, 2006), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/200603020148.html (quoting an eye witness who “knew they were 
policemen”). 
 178. See England, supra note 177 (reporting that raids came after journalists 
from The Standard were arrested for writing an article alleging that President 
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Subsequently, the Standard Group consistently pointed an accusing 
finger at the government and called for inquiries into the horrifying 
assault.179  
Several attempts were made to unravel the “mysterious” raid, but 
to no avail, as the government vehemently denies any wrongdoing.180 
To date, the confiscated equipment has yet to be returned and the 
reasons and people behind the raid remain unanswered. But, 
Kenyans have a somewhat clear idea on the instigators and 
 
Kibaki held a secret meeting with an opposition leader); Lora, supra note 177 
(commenting that the Kenyan government had recently come under fire from the 
news media over allegations of corruption); Africa in Focus: Kibaki Asked to State 
Stand on Attacks, SUDAN VISION DAILY (Mar. 6, 2006, 8:51 UTC), 
http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=11
252 [hereinafter Kibaki Asked to State Stand on Attacks] (citing a group of thirty 
NGOs as hinting that “the raid was meant to destroy corruption-related information 
touching on powerful government ministers”).  
 179. See Tom Rhodes, Mission Journal: Mysterious Raid Draws New Concerns, 
COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS BLOG (Apr. 22, 2009, 11:43 AM), 
http://cpj.org/blog/2009/04/mission-journal-mysterious-raid-draws-new-concerns. 
php (indicating that in an interview by Tom Rhodes of the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, KTN researcher Patrick Mugo stated: “We at KTN believed it was 
individuals within the government and security services that ordered the raid”); see 
also The Standard Team, Assault an Attack on Media Freedom, Says CEO, 
ALLAFRICA.COM (Mar. 2, 2006), http://allafrica.com/stories/2006030 20147.html 
[hereinafter Attack on Media Freedom] (noting that the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Standard Group publicly denounced the invasion as unjustified and demanded 
an explanation from the government). 
 180. See Rhodes, supra note 179 (quoting a government official denying the 
government’s involvement). Almost immediately after the raid, the National 
Assembly, largely inspired by an overwhelming public outcry, took action; the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, chaired by the then 
Member of Parliament for Kabete, Mr. Paul Muite, put the government to task to 
explain the circumstances surrounding the raid. Unfortunately, the Executive 
remained defiant. Similarly, in June 2006, under intense public and political 
pressures, President Kibaki created a Commission of Inquiry, chaired by the 
former Commissioner of Police, Shadrack Kiruki, to look into the activities of two 
Armenian brothers, Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargasyan, who were widely 
believed to have implemented the raid on behalf of the government. Unfortunately, 
like many other reports of inconsequential commissions of inquiry, the 
Commission’s reports, which were presented to the President later in 2006, are yet 
to be released for public consumption. Accordingly, the entire issue remains as 
enigmatic as the Artur brothers themselves. Id.; see Alex Ndegwa, Kibakis Now 
Turn Their Fury on Standard Group, THE STANDARD (Kenya), Mar. 3, 2010, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144009166&cid=4 (stating 
that the report is “believed to have revealed damning details of the [g]overnment’s 
involvement in the Artur saga”). 
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implementers behind the raid;181 the day after the raid, the then 
Internal Security Minister, John Michuki, who many believe was the 
major force behind the raid, told the press that the raid was a police 
operation to protect state security.182 Michuki vehemently retorted, 
“[i]f you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be bitten by it.”183  
It can be plausibly deduced that the incident, notwithstanding the 
purported motive for the raid, sent a strong message that Kenya’s 
press “could be censored at any time without warning.”184 It must be 
noted that, in its aftermath, the raid generated a plethora of questions, 
many of which still remain unanswered. For instance, many still ask: 
What national security interests would have been jeopardized (as 
claimed by the Minister) by the unraveling of a gross corruption 
scandal in the government? What public interest would have been 
advanced by the forcible raid (to avert disclosure of the 
information)? Kenyans have generally come to the conclusion that 
the raid could not be justified on the ground of national security.185 In 
fact, many have cleared their conscience that the raid violated the 
public’s inherent right of access to information and outright denied 
the public’s right to information regarding the conduct of public 
affairs. Furthermore, it can be safely argued that the raid was 
unjustified as it merely sought to conceal crucial information on the 
 
 181. See Rhodes, supra note 179 (indicating that even though the Commissioner 
of Police, Major-General Hussein M. Ali, emphatically disputed police 
involvement, subsequent investigations revealed that the raid was carried out by 
State security agents, led by two government-hired Armenian mercenaries—the 
Artur Brothers). 
 182. See Kenyan TV and Newspaper Raided by Masked Police,  WIKINEWS, 
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Kenyan_TV_and_newspaper_raided_by_masked_poli
ce (giving an account of the horrid events of the night). 
 183. Kenya Admits Armed Raid on Paper, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4765250.stm [hereinafter Kenya Admits Armed Raid]; 
The Standard Team, State Owns Up To Raid, ALLAFRICA.COM (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603020145.html. 
 184. Rhodes, supra note 179; see Chris Wamalwa, The East African Standard—
Kibaki May Have Known About “Standard Raid”—Former Corruption Tsar, 
PROPERTYKENYA (Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.propertykenya.com/news/001013-
kibaki-may-have-known-about-standard-raid---former-corruption-tsar (suggesting 
that, in light of his silence, President Kibaki may have personally known of the 
raid). 
 185. See England, supra note 177 (noting that human rights workers, politicians 
and diplomats condemned the raid); see also Attack on Media Freedom, supra note 
179 (suggesting that a broad goal of the raid was to intimidate the media). 
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functioning of public institutions, in particular to protect the Kibaki 
government from the sort of embarrassment attendant to the 
exposure of wrongdoing.  
In a nutshell, in light of the circumstances surrounding it, the raid, 
which thwarted the Standard Group’s planned release of damning 
reports,186 violated Kenya’s relevant obligations under the UNCAC, 
the A.U. Convention on Corruption, the ACECA, and reasonable 
moral and ethical standards.187 To be sure, the raid vividly illustrates 
the government’s uneasiness with the media.188 
3. Intimidation by the “Mighty” 
For their part in the anti-corruption crusade, journalists have 
tirelessly engaged in independent investigations into cases of graft 
and corruption in the country. Unfortunately, this particular discourse 
has not been a smooth one. As their endeavors frequently “ruffled 
feathers,” various journalists have constantly reported receiving 
threats to their lives and security.  
For instance, on December 24, 2009, the Daily Nation carried a 
story on a threat to a KTN journalist by the Commissioner-General 
of the Kenya Revenue Authority following the TV station’s 
“investigative story on alleged corruption at the port of Mombasa.”189 
Though the chief tax collector denied these allegations, the affected 
news reporter vehemently maintained that he, on several occasions, 
received “veiled threats.”190  
This case is only one of many reported every other day by Kenyan 
journalists engaged in the anti-corruption crusade in the country. It 
cannot be gainsaid that such intimidation of journalists limits not 
 
 186. See Kibaki Asked to State Stand on Attacks, supra note 178 (“The move 
was an act of intimidation intended to derail efforts by the media on the fight 
against corruption . . . .”).  
 187. See generally G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 31; Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act, (2009) Cap. 65 pmbl. (Kenya), available at 
http://www.kacc.go.ke/docs/legal/aceca.pdf. 
 188. Cf. Kenya Admits Armed Raid, supra note 183 (criticizing the government 
for using resources to intimidate the media and suggesting that such resources be 
devoted to battling corruption). 
 189. See TV’s Graft Story Ruffles Feathers, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Dec. 23, 
2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/830288/-/von5k8/-/index.html. 
 190. Id. (noting that the alleged threats were characterized as “reckless, wanting 
and unprofessional”). 
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only the freedom of expression of the individual journalists, but also 
of all citizens.191 This is because intimidation produces a chilling 
effect on the free flow of information within the society, thereby 
impeding accountability and transparency,192 two critical aspects of 
democratic governance.  
4. “Defamation” Litigation 
The old constitutional dispensation limited the freedom of 
expression by subjecting it to respect for the “reputations, rights and 
freedoms” of others.193 This crucially laid the foundation for 
defamation law, which strives to protect the reputations of 
individuals and redress injuries occasioned by any offensive 
publication.194  
The current Kenyan defamation regime has its foundations in the 
Defamation Act of 1969, which was amended in 1992 to introduce 
minimum damages for certain kinds of libel.195 To date, this 
particular amendment has firmly stood in the media’s path to 
effective engagement in the anti-corruption crusade. Politicians 
named and shamed for allegations of corruption have continually 
crowded the corridors of the courts to claim hefty damages for 
libel.196 The frequent success enjoyed by these plaintiffs has led the 
 
 191. See Joint Declaration, supra note 108. 
 192. Id. 
 193. CONSTITUTION, § 79 (2008) (Kenya). 
 194. On the definition of defamation, see Article 19, Defining Defamation: 
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation (July 2000), 
available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf 
[hereinafter Defining Defamation: Principles]. The Principles were produced at a 
Article 19 workshop held in London on February 29 through March 1, 2000, which 
was attended by a number of individual experts in international human rights law. 
Id. at intro.  
 195. See The Defamation Act, (2005) Cap. 36 § 16A (Kenya) (establishing 
minimum damages of one million shillings when the libel relates to “an offence 
punishable by death,” and minimum damages of four hundred thousand shillings 
for a libel relating to an offence punishable by a prison term no less than three 
years). It is hardly surprising that this move came at a time when several prominent 
politicians in the Moi regime were facing serious accusations of corruption. 
 196. See Harold Ayodo, The Standard Team—Nyachae Sh20 Million Suit is 
Dismissed, ALLAFRICA.COM (Jan. 23, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200701 
240442.html (explaining that politicians have bombarded courts with defamation 
suits to “protect what they perceive to be their good character”). 
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public to suspect a high-level judicial conspiracy.  
A number of concluded cases illustrate the extent to which the 
judiciary was utilized (by the State) to muzzle the press,197 with the 
defamation litigation (brought by powerful politicians) effectively 
marring the media’s efforts to meaningfully engage in the anti-
corruption crusade in Kenya.198 One such case is Biwott v. Clays 
Limited,199 where the plaintiff, then a very powerful Minister in the 
Moi government, alleged that his reputation was severely and 
wantonly attacked and injured by the defendants in a U.K.-published 
book entitled Dr. Iain West’s Casebook.200 This case opened the 
floodgates for prohibitive awards. In what was later termed a 
repressive judgment, the High Court awarded Mr. Biwott a total of 
KES 30 million (approx. USD 375,000) in damages, the highest 
award for an unliquidated claim in Kenya’s history.201  
Another case in point, coincidentally involving the same plaintiff, 
is Biwott v. Mbugguss.202 Here, the plaintiff sued the defendants for 
defamatory words published on the front page of The People 
newspaper on March 10, 1999.203 The allegedly libelous words were 
 
 197. See Odhiambo, supra note 22, at 298-301 (summarizing the outcome of 
several cases, including one where the High Court issued an injunction barring the 
publication of an allegedly “seditious” portrait of President Kibaki). 
 198. On the ideal application of defamation laws, see Defining Defamation: 
Principles, supra note 194. Principle 2 defines the legitimate purpose of 
defamation laws as protection of individuals against injury by exposure to ridicule, 
hatred, shunning, and avoidance by right-thinking members of the society; 
Principle 8 prohibits protection of public officials, regardless of their ranks or 
status; Principle 13 provides that the role of remedies is to redress the harm to the 
plaintiff’s reputation, not to punish the defendant; Principle 14 calls on courts to 
prioritize non-pecuniary remedies as a means to redress harm; and Principle 15 
provides that pecuniary compensation is to be awarded only where non-pecuniary 
remedies are insufficient. Id. princs. 2, 8, 13-15. 
 199. See MEDIA LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 112, at 564 (reproducing the 
court’s judgment in the Biwott case). 
 200. See CHESTER STERN, DR. IAIN WEST’S CASEBOOK 88-93 (1996) (alleging 
that the minister was widely suspected of being the most corrupt of Moi’s 
ministers and had participated in the murder of his cabinet colleague, Dr. Robert 
Ouko). 
 201. See MEDIA LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 112, at 578 (reporting that the 
court awarded KES 15 million for compensatory damages and KES 15 million for 
exemplary damages). 
 202. (2002) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya), available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/ 
CaseSearch/view_preview.php?link=3698601102984961443425&words. 
 203. Id. 
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part of the paper’s report on corruption amidst the government’s plan 
to build a mega hydro-power plant by damming the Turkwel River 
(in Kenya’s North Rift region).204 Once again, the court awarded the 
plaintiff a lucrative sum of KES 20 million (approx. USD 250,000) 
in damages for the libel.205 
Going by the precedents set in these and other cases, the high 
defamation awards and fines chill the effectiveness of the media 
generally and its engagement in the anti-corruption crusade 
specifically.206 It hardly goes without saying that, though the advent 
of the New Constitution (2010) normatively heralds a big sigh of 
relief, all will depend on the approach and attitude of the judiciary. 
Thus the new constitutional dispensation will only bear meaning (for 
the media) if the judiciary manifests sustained readiness and 
willingness to discourage suppressive defamation litigation. 
5. General Non-Enforceability of International Human Rights Law 
(under the Old Constitutional Dispensation) 
Though Kenya has been quick in showing its support for virtually 
every human rights instrument that finds its way before international 
and regional bodies, the position of international human rights law in 
the Kenyan legal system has, until August 27, 2010, remained vague. 
The Old Constitution (rev. 2008) was silent on the local position 
and/or application of international human rights law in the country.  
Going by the precedent set in the landmark decision of Okunda v. 
Republic,207 which has for long been regarded as the locus classicus 
on the subject, the High Court of Kenya has severally ruled that mere 
ratification does not make an international instrument binding on the 
 
 204. See id. (describing the facts giving rise to Biwott’s claim against Mbugguss 
in the section entitled “The untold story on Moi-Nyachae”). 
 205. See MEDIA LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 112, at 562 (reporting the award 
of KES 10 million for compensatory and another KES 10 million for exemplary 
damages). 
 206. See World Bank, Access to Information, Media and Accountability in 
Kenya Workshop, Lake Naivasha Lodge, Kenya, Nov. 1-3, 2007, Summary Report 
and Action Plan, at 5, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/ 
Resources/NaivashaWshopReportandActionPlanwithAddendum.pdf (explaining 
that Kenya’s legal environment is one of the major challenges affecting the media 
in enhancing access to information).  
 207. (1970) E.A.L.R. 453 (Kenya). 
80 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:1 
Kenyan government. As such, instruments have no force of law 
unless and until they are domesticated by the National Assembly 
through legislation.208  
Sadly, Kenya has done very little in this respect; without 
domesticating legislation, her signature on human rights instruments 
has remained inconsequential for the national cause of human 
rights.209 Indeed, until the promulgation of the New Constitution 
(2010), this remained a major challenge in the enforcement of the 
freedom of expression and the corollary right to information, like 
many other rights and freedoms. Fortunately, the advent of the new 
dispensation heralds a number of gains, including clarification of the 
position of international [human rights] law in Kenya.210 
6. Inadequate Redress Framework (under the Old Constitutional 
Dispensation) 
Under the old constitutional dispensation, the level of redress 
offered for violations of human rights and freedoms was barely 
adequate; the prevailing legal regime failed to provide for adequate 
redress for aggrieved journalists, media houses, and members of the 
public, yet it handsomely rewarded those allegedly offended by these 
entities.211 It was similarly unfortunate that definitions of rights and 
 
 208. See id. at 459 (”[T]he provisions of a treaty entered into by the Government 
of Kenya do not become part of the municipal law of Kenya, save insofar as they 
are made such by the law of Kenya.”); see also International Law Does Not 
Compromise Sovereignty?, DAILY NATION (Kenya), June 10, 2010, at 1, available 
at 2010 WLNR 12012945 [hereinafter Compromise Sovereignty?] (explaining that 
treaties do not officially become Kenyan law unless they are “formally converted 
into an Act of Parliament”). 
 209. See Compromise Sovereignty?, supra note 208 (giving the example that it 
took nearly ten years for Kenya to implement the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child after signing it because of complicated ratification procedures). 
 210. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 2(5)-(6), 21(4) (2010) (Kenya) (providing that 
“general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya,” that “any 
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya,” and 
that “[t]he State shall enact and implement legislation to fulfil [her] international 
obligations in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms”). 
 211. Cf. Ndung’u Wainaina, Contrary to Claims, MPs Are Not Speaking for 
Their Constituents, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Mar. 20, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 5973840 (remarking that Kenya’s legal system lacks the proper rule of 
law, which leads to an inequitable administration of the laws and threatens basic 
civil liberties). 
2010] THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CRUSADE 81 
 
freedoms were largely “determined” by a partisan judicial system,212 
a reality that further skewed the scales of justice. Consequently, the 
quest for redress against the government and high-ranking public 
officials was largely futile over the years. This has compounded and 
perpetuated frustrations with the Kenyan justice system.  
To make matters worse, as noted above, aggrieved individuals and 
media houses could not seek redress under existing regional and/or 
international instruments to which Kenya is a party.213 Furthermore, 
reliance on regional and international redress mechanisms is 
practically hampered because Kenya has not formally acknowledged 
the competence of such mechanisms, particularly in the realm of the 
individualized complaint procedures available through the ICCPR 
and other international instruments.214 
The New Constitution (2010) establishes a comprehensive web of 
redress mechanisms, both judicial215 and quasi-judicial.216 Strikingly, 
the locus standi is generally open as to allow any party, including 
that acting on behalf of another, to petition the competent body to 
enforce the rights guaranteed.217 It must be noted that the right 
extends to actual denial, violation or infringement, or threats to the 
 
 212. See Ahmednasir Abdullahi, Op-Ed., Daily Nation—Time for Pro-Reform 
Judges to Speak Out, ALLAFRICA.COM (May 29, 2010), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/201005310228.html (criticizing a High Court decision for pandering to the 
Executive by issuing a “perplexingly small-minded and bigoted judgment”). 
 213. See supra Part IV(A)(5). 
 214. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights arts. 1-2, 4-5, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (establishing a 
committee to receive and consider communications from victims of violations of 
the ICCPR); Status of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2010) (showing that Kenya has not ratified this protocol). Because Kenya 
has yet to become a party to the Protocol, aggrieved Kenyans have little recourse 
for ICCPR violations. 
 215. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 22(1), 165(3)(b) (2010) (Kenya) (granting the 
right to “institute court proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom . 
. . has been denied,” and instilling in the High Court subject matter jurisdiction 
over these claims). 
 216. See id. arts. 59(1), (2)(e) (establishing the Kenya National Human Rights 
and Equality Commission, whose tasks include “monitor[ing], investigat[ing], and 
report[ing] on the observance of human rights in all spheres of life in the Republic, 
including observance by the national security organs”). 
 217. Id. arts. 22(1)-(2), 59(3). 
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protected rights.218 
 7. Lack of Sustained Political Goodwill 
Generally, since corruption is a political offense, the fight against 
it requires sustainable political goodwill. Unfortunately, the Kenyan 
leadership fails to offer this goodwill, and, notwithstanding the 
rhetoric in official speeches, corruption continues to reign with 
reckless abandon.219 Consequently, over the years the spoils of 
corruption have lined the pockets of many government leaders so 
that any authentic move to stop the rot and expose the villains has 
become a Herculean task.220  
Indeed, today, and possibly into the foreseeable future, governance 
and anti-corruption reforms remain key challenges facing Kenya’s 
efforts to resuscitate and sustain economic growth in the path toward 
greater national development.221 
B. INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
Over and above the external challenges imposed upon it, the 
Kenyan media faces a number of internal hurdles that equally 
adversely impact its engagement in the anti-corruption crusade in the 
 
 218. Id. arts. 22(1), 59(3), 165(3)(b). 
 219. See GITHONGO DOSSIER, supra note 129, ¶¶ 19, 23 (illustrating the 
government’s lack of commitment through the in-house frustrations faced by the 
former anti-graft tsar, John Githongo, whose professional approach to combating 
corruption was hindered by corrupt officials’ intimidation tactics and the 
President’s inaction). 
 220. See Wainaina, supra note 211 (arguing for major constitutional reforms 
that will combat institutionalized corruption and re-establish democratic 
principles); Mutuma Mathiu, Kenyan Politics as a Process of Laundering Thieves 
and Murderers, AFRO ARTICLES (Dec. 9, 2007), http://www.afroarticles.com/ 
article-dashboard/Article/Politics-as-the-process-of-laundering-thieves-and-
murderers/62753 (explaining the vicious cycle of corruption in Kenyan politics); 
see also AFR. CTR. FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE, SHATTERED DREAMS: AN AUDIT OF 
THE KIBAKI GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE 2003-2007 (2008), 
available at http://www.africog.org/reports/Narc%20Audit.pdf (detailing how 
Kibaki’s government generally failed to deliver on its promise to fight corruption). 
 221. The Kenya Vision 2030 Program, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL OF 
KENYA, http://www.nesc.go.ke/News&Events/KenyaVision2030Intro.htm (last 
updated Oct. 4, 2007) (explaining that “Vision 2030,” launched on June 10, 2008, 
is an ambitious economic development plan that aims at producing an annual 
economic growth rate of over 10%, targeting six key economic sectors—tourism, 
agriculture, manufacturing, trade, information technology and financial services). 
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country.  
1. Overemphasis on the Public Sector 
Over the years, in its quest to highlight corruption in the country, 
the Kenyan media has, unfortunately, disproportionately emphasized 
corruption in the public sector; most, if not all, headline-grabbing 
news relates to high-level corruption within the government. A 
cursory review of the available information reveals that, more often 
than not, little attention is given to corruption in the private sector, 
yet that sector is equally marred.222 Without prejudice to the media’s 
tireless efforts, it must nonetheless be stated that, undoubtedly, 
information on corruption in the private sector needs equal emphasis 
and public attention if the anti-corruption crusade is to assume a 
holistic face or is to achieve comprehensive success.223 
2. “Elitism” and “Urban Bias” 
The Kenyan media suffers from “elitism,” a situation that has 
made it rather difficult for ordinary Kenyans to be reached. For 
instance, in their quest for information on corruption in the country, 
media outlets almost exclusively interact with elites in urban-based 
civil society organizations; hardly ever do they interact with ordinary 
Kenyans in villages or grassroots-based organizations.224  
 
 222. See EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 2009, supra note 13, at 19 (indicating 
that the Kenyan private sector currently ranks as the eighteenth most corrupt entity 
in the country). See generally GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009, supra note 14, 
at 3-4 (commenting on the importance of the private sector at the individual and 
national levels to enhance the standard of living and catalyze progress, and noting 
that private sector corruption damages vital State and individual interests). 
 223. See GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the 
private sector as pivotal to improving the community but also noting that it is able 
to “disenfranchise [and] destabilize society and foster corruption”). 
 224. See Dele Ogunade, The Mass Media Systems of Kenya and Tanzania: A 
Comparative Analysis, 1 AFR. MEDIA. REV. 99, 106 (1986), available at 
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/africa%20media%20rev
iew/vol1no1/jamr001001009.pdf (suggesting that the media “lack[s] . . . a well-
defined concept of what is African about it”); Do You Know Kenya’s New 
Agenda?, BUNGE LA MWANANCHI (June 21, 2010), http://www.bungela 
mwananchi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1272:do-you-
know-kenyas-new-agenda-&catid=125:special-articles&Itemid=63 (proclaiming 
the establishment of a new newspaper for grassroots Kenyans in response to the 
elitist mainstream Kenyan media).  
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Consequently, the media’s presentation of information has been 
inevitably skewed in favor of the needs of elites and urban dwellers; 
it has significantly impacted on the quality of reporting as the 
journalists hardly venture into the rural settings, where the bulk of 
unreported corruption cases occur every other day. Furthermore, the 
media has been practically aloof from rural life, with no meaningful 
grassroots contacts to gather and report on cases of corruption in the 
hardship-prone rural areas. 
3. Corruption in the Media 
Unfortunately, the creeping of corruption has not spared the media 
itself. Though perception of corruption is generally low, as compared 
to that in the public sector and other private sector entities, media 
houses have been regularly cited as corrupt,225 scoring about 1.8 on 
TI’s global corruption barometer,226 with the vice being reportedly 
rife during electioneering periods.227 
4. Lack of Follow-up 
Like the general Kenyan population, the media suffers “memory 
 
 225. See Fredrick Mudhai, Time to Harvest? Media, Corruption and Elections in 
Kenya, 4 INT’L J. COMM. ETHICS 30, 34 (2007) (chronicling several instances of 
media corruption and suggesting that “perhaps [media codes of conduct] can work 
best if they can be seen to help expose cases of media corruption”).  
 226. See GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2009, supra note 17, at 29 
(indicating that corruption perception in Kenya for political parties, parliament, the 
private sector, media, civil servants, and the judiciary has a cumulative average of 
3.5 on a scale of 1 to 5). 
 227. See J. S. Kadhi, Raila is the Media Darling in Elections, 
MEDIAWATCHMAN (April 4, 2007), http://mediawatchman.blogspot.com 
(reporting that during the campaigns for the 2007 General Elections, the 
mainstream press in Kenya particularly favored presidential candidate Raila 
Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement to the extent that journalists could be 
“guilty of manipulation of news, either actively or passively”); Jeff Otieno, Daily 
Nation—PNU and ODM Get Most Coverage, ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200710311023.html (summarizing the findings of a 
study by Strategic Research for the Media Council, together with UNDP, which 
concluded that certain political parties received disproportionate amounts of media 
attention in election reporting); Morton Saulo, The Standard—Media Coverage 
Favours Kibaki, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 13, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
200710121148.html (reporting that a recent survey, which analyzed re-election 
campaign coverage, found “a general bias in favour of the President in both State-
owned and private media”). 
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volatility;” after highlighting a corruption case, the media sooner 
than later forgets about the same. In the absence of consistent follow-
up, the highlights themselves are the only achievement. It hardly 
goes without emphasis that the anti-corruption crusade demands 
consistent follow-up, where issues have to be revisited to assess the 
progress made, if any, and to forge the way forward in the hallowed 
anti-corruption battle. 
V. INTO THE FUTURE: PROSPECTS AND THE 
WAY FORWARD 
A. PROSPECTS FOR THE KENYAN MEDIA 
Though the battle for freedom of expression and the right to 
information in Kenya is yet to be fully won, prospects are reasonably 
bright. A number of developments lend credence to this optimism. 
For instance, the government is gradually gaining some degree of 
sanity as it cedes to constant demands for the release of its grip on 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular the 
freedom of expression and the right to information.228  
Reportedly, the government is currently working on legislation 
aimed at creating an environment generally conducive for the 
freedom of information, with consultative discussions focusing on 
how to improve the Freedom of Information Bill, 2005.229 The 
 
 228. See, e.g., Walter Menya, Gov’t Willing to Review Media Law, Says Ndemo, 
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/851062/-/vpvv26/-/index.html (indicating that on Jan. 28, 2010 the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information (Mr. Bitange Ndemo) 
acknowledged that repression under current media laws may have resulted from 
poor drafting, and promised that the government is ready to look into it). This 
statement of Mr. Ndemo likely heralded a big sigh of relief from the media, which 
had been very suspicious of the government’s motives as it continually tightened 
its grip on media houses and other related entities. 
 229. Freedom of Information Bill (2005) (Kenya), available at 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/LawsandConventions/Kenya_Draft_Free
dom_of_Information_Bill.pdf; see Bitange Ndemo, Op.-Ed., Daily Nation—Your 
Editorial Was Meant to Besmirch the Government, ALLAFRICA.COM (May 10, 
2010), http://allafrica.com/ stories/201005101804.html (rebuking criticisms of the 
government’s record on the freedom of the press and describing the new Freedom 
of Information Bill as a progressive piece of legislation that “will place Kenya 
among an enviably small number of countries embracing the principle of the right 
to information”). 
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legislation, if passed, seeks to provide a right of access to 
information held by public bodies, subject to certain exceptions.230 
More importantly, the country has just adopted a new Constitution. 
The New Constitution, which entered into force on August 27, 2010, 
contains a number of innovative in-roads to generally recognize and 
protect universally-recognized human rights, specifically including 
the freedom of expression,231 the freedom of the media,232 and the 
right to information.233 
Be that as it may, the gains must be monitored; otherwise they 
may be erased quickly. This sentiment is echoed by the President of 
the United States of America, Barack Obama, who, during his visit to 
the offices of The Standard in Nairobi months after the infamous 
raid, remarked: “Press freedom is like tending a garden, it’s never 
done. It continually has to be nurtured and cultivated and the 
citizenry has to value it. It’s one of those things that can slip away if 
we don’t tend to it.”234 
B. THE WAY FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the achievements, challenges, and prospects for the 
engagement of the media in the anti-corruption crusade in Kenya, 
this paper offers two major recommendations to enhance the media’s 
role as society strives to take the anti-corruption crusade in Kenya to 
a higher level: 
1. NORMATIVELY, Kenya has to establish a comprehensive 
and enduring normative framework for the protection of the 
freedom of expression, the freedom of the media, and the right to 
information.235 It would be desirable if—  
 
 230. See generally Freedom of Information Bill (Proposed Draft 2007) (Kenya), 
available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/international/ 
laws_papers/kenya/kenya_govt_foi_bill_apr07.pdf (providing the public with the 
right to access information held by the government, public authorities, and certain 
private bodies). Once passed, the Bill will have an ex post facto justification for the 
government’s Freedom of Information Policy. Id. 
 231. CONSTITUTION, art. 33 (2010) (Kenya). 
 232. Id. art. 34. 
 233. Id. art. 35. 
 234. Rhodes, supra note 179. 
 235. The country has to adumbrate the gains made in the New Constitution, 
which recognizes these freedoms and rights. CONSTITUTION, arts. 33-35 (2010) 
(Kenya). 
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(a) the protective regime enshrined in the New Bill of 
Rights236 is adequately supplemented by a comprehensive 
legislation to govern realization of the concerned rights and 
freedoms, with adequate checks against erosion and 
withering;237 and 
(b) the legislation unlinks the right to freedom of information 
from the freedom of expression so that it is not viewed as a 
media issue. This spirit can already be discerned from the 
New Constitution (2010), which guarantees the right to 
information as a self-standing right.238 
2.  INSTITUTIONALLY, Kenya needs to move beyond mere 
aspirations. To realize this, the government must: 
(a) put in place a credible institutional framework to monitor 
implementation of the above norms, while availing adequate 
redress for violations thereof;239 
(b) put in place a credible institutional framework for dealing 
with corruption in the country, as envisaged in the New 
Constitution (2010);240 and 
(c) accede to the prevailing international redress mechanisms, 
in particular the individual complaints procedures within the 
international and regional human rights systems. 
 
 236. Id.  
 237. This proposal is intended to guide, for instance, deliberations on the 
Freedom of Information Bill (Proposed Draft 2007) (Kenya), available at 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/international/laws_papers/ 
kenya/kenya_govt_foi_bill_apr07.pdf.  
 238. CONSTITUTION, art. 35(1) (2010) (Kenya).  
 239. In this respect, the government has to hasten the on-going reform of the 
judicial and quasi-judicial redress mechanisms to ensure that, ultimately, justice is 
not only done but shall always seem to be done. This would, for instance, require 
the government to reform the judiciary (where the High Court wields the 
jurisdiction to hear human rights cases) and revamp the proposed Kenya National 
Human Rights and Equality Commission, established under article 59(1) of the 
New Constitution.  
 240. This shall require the government to put in place a new-look independent 
ethics and anti-corruption commission to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
Chapter 6 of the New Constitution (arts. 73-80), which embodies a comprehensive 
regime on leadership and integrity in the public service.  
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CONCLUSION 
In a nutshell, this article modestly posits that the fight against 
corruption can only be authentic if the media freely engages in the 
public discourse, without any undue suppression of its activities. 
Proceeding on the argument that the freedom of expression is one of 
the integral bulwarks of the anti-corruption crusade, it demonstrates 
that the freedom is indispensable to unearthing and publicizing the 
hitherto unknown vices in the public and private sectors.241 
Additionally, this article notes that the exercise of the freedom of 
expression, hence the right to access information, is unfortunately 
not without challenges.242 
Like every other human right or freedom, the two concepts are 
largely honored more in violation than in respect for their letters and 
spirits. In this respect, the article amply references the successive 
Kenyan governments’ frequent efforts to gag the media, especially 
with regard to the anti-corruption crusade. Sadly, this has been the 
case throughout mankind’s history, and it is no surprise that the 
influential French Emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, remarked over two 
centuries ago: “I fear three newspapers more than a hundred 
thousand bayonets.”243 
 
 
 241. See supra Part II. 
 242. See supra Parts III-IV. 
 243. See THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 254. 
